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This is the second installment in a series of three papers studying the behavior 
of men at the end of the life cycle. The first paper (Rust 1989) constructed a 
theoretical model based on the hypothesis that workers maximize expected 
discounted lifetime utility. The model treats observed behavior as a realization 
of  a  controlled  stochastic  process  {xt, d,} derived  from  the  solution  to  a 
stochastic dynamic programming problem (DP). Estimation of the DP model 
requires observations of the worker’s stute x, and control d,  and a specification 
of  the  Markov  transition  probability  density  IT(X,+  ,lx,, d,) representing  a 
stochastic “law of  motion”  that embodies workers’ beliefs of uncertain future 
events. 
This paper uses the Retirement History Survey (RHS) to construct state and 
control variables {x,;, dtl},  t  =  1, . . . ,  Ti,  i  = I, . . ., I, for  a sample of 
I  = 8,131 male  respondents  interviewed  biennially  from  1969 to  1979. I 
discuss some of the conceptual problems involved in constructing measure- 
ments of  {x,, d,} so that the resulting  discrete-time,  discrete-state DP model 
makes  the  best  possible  approximation  to the  underlying  continuous-time, 
continuous-state decision process. I present my solutions to the measurement 
problems and conduct  an extensive comparative data analysis to assess the 
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overall  quality  of  the  resulting  variables.  Finally,  I  present  estimates  of 
workers’ beliefs, in the form of an estimated transition probability  matrix I?. 
All this work is building up to the third paper of  the series, which will use 
the  constructed  state  and  control  variables  and  the  estimated  transition 
probability matrix  as inputs to a  “nested  fixed point”  maximum  likelihood 
algorithm (Rust 1988) to estimate the unknown parameters of workers’ utility 
functions.  The  success  of  the  final  stage  depends  critically  on  accurate 
measurements of {x,,  d,} and correct specification  of workers’ beliefs T. 
The paper is organized as follows. The key parts of the paper are sections 
1 I.  1 and  1 1.2,  which summarize the principal findings. Section 1 1.1  describes 
the state and control variables constructed from the RHS data set and presents 
the main conclusions of the data analysis. Section 1 1.2 specifies the functional 
form  of  workers’  beliefs  and  summarizes  the  conclusions  about  workers’ 
beliefs  T.  The remaining  sections  present  details  on  the  construction  of 
{x,,  d,} and the specification and estimation of .ir  that compose the evidence for 
the  conclusions  drawn  in  sections  11.1 and  11.2; they  can  be  skipped  or 
skimmed by readers who are content to accept my view of the “stylized facts.” 
11.1  State and Control Variables: Main Findings 
Following the notation of Rust (1989), the DP model requires a vector of 
state variables, x,  = (w,, y,, aw,, sr,, h,, a,, e,, ms,), defined by 
w,  :  accumulated net financial and tangible nonfinancial  wealth, 
y,:  total income from earnings and assets, 
aw,: Social Security  “average monthly wage,” 
sr,:  Social Security status (receiving OASDIinot receiving OASDI), 
h, :  health status of  worker (good healthipoor healthidisabledldead), 
a,:  age of worker, 
e,  :  employment  status (full timeipart timeinot employed), 
ms,:  marital  status (marriedisingle), 
and control variables,  d, = (c,, s,,  ss,), defined by 
c,:  planned consumption expenditures, 
s,:  employment  search decision (full timeipart  time/exit labor force), 
ss,: Social Security decision (apply for OASDIido not apply for OASDI) 
In  the  last twenty  years, several panel  data  sets have accumulated  suffi- 
ciently detailed data to permit construction of the required variables: the Panel 
Survey  on  Income  Dynamics  (PSID), the  National  Longitudinal  Survey 
(NLS), and the Retirement History Survey (RHS). Of these, the RHS has the 
largest  and  most  comprehensive coverage  of  older  workers  since  it  was 
explicitly designed by  the Social Security Administration  (SSA) to obtain a 
detailed picture of the transition from work into retirement.  A special feature 
of the RHS is the availability of matching records from the Census Bureau and 319  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
SSA that permit direct validation of response error in several key variables. 
The Social Security Earnings Record (SSER) contains each covered worker’s 
wage earnings (up to the statutory maximum taxable earnings) and quarters of 
coverage from 1939 to  1974. The Social Security Master Beneficiary Record 
(SSMBR) contains  actual  payments of  Social Security  old  age, survivors, 
disability,  and  death  benefits  (OASDI)  to  each  respondent,  spouse,  and 
dependent from 1969 to 1978. The combination of finely detailed data, large 
sample size, and long duration, plus the existence of  linked Census and SSA 
records, makes the RHS the data set of choice for estimating the DP model. 
Having said this is not to deny the sober truth that, even with the linked RHS 
records, there is a limit to how accurately one can measure the “true”  states 
and decisions of individuals.  Besides the obvious problems of missing data, 
response and coding error, estimation of the DP  model presents three additional 
problems:  choice  of  time discretization, choice of  state discretization,  and 
construction of observable indicators of  latent state and control variables. 
Although  the  individual’s  actual  decision  process  is  best  modeled  in 
continuous time, the data are collected  and the DP model  is formulated  in 
discrete time. In theory, use of  discrete-time models is not a limitation since 
it  has been  shown that  under  very  general  conditions  one can formulate  a 
discrete-time DP model that approximates an underlying continuous-time DP 
model arbitrarily closely as the time interval goes to zero (van Dijk 1984). One 
can account for absence of data on (xr,  d,) between survey dates by forming 
a marginal likelihood function that ‘‘integrates out” the missing observations. 
In  practice,  however,  computational and data  limitations  forced  me to use 
fairly coarse two-year time intervals. The computational limitations arise from 
the numerical integrations required to form the marginal likelihood function 
and the “curse of dimemsionality” inherent in DP models with fine time grids. 
The data limitations  stem from the lack  of  measures  of  income flows  for 
intervals shorter than one year. 
Even if a complete set of  “instantaneous”  state and control variables could 
be constructed, I  would still prefer to use annual measures in the belief that 
they better capture the worker’s retirement  behavior than a series of  “snap- 
shots” at fairly widely spaced time intervals.  Analytically, the disadvantage 
of  the  discretization  is that  it implicitly  precommits  workers  to fixed con- 
sumption and labor supply values over two-year time intervals. I should point 
out, however,  that, even with a two-year time interval, the worker is given 
thirty opportunities to revise his decisions between age 58 and the terminal 
age, 108. Such a model is quite a bit more flexible than the standard approach, 
which models retirement as a once and for all choice from a nonlinear budget 
set that describes alternative consumptiodwork levels that are assumed fixed 
for the duration of the worker’s lifetime (see, e.g., Burtless and Moffitt 1984). 
These sorts of  static perfect-certainty  models do not  allow for any  ex post 
revision in consumption or labor supply in light of new information. Whether 
a model with thirty periods (sixty years) can provide  sufficient flexibility to 320  John Rust 
model workers’ decision processes accurately is a deeper question. I leave the 
analysis of the consequences of time aggregation to the actual estimation of the 
DP model in the third paper of this series. 
The state variables y,, w,,  and aw,,  which are typically treated as continuous, 
must also be discretized  in order to estimate the DP model.  Similar to the 
discretization of  time, there are theorems guaranteeing  that one can approx- 
imate a continuous-state  DP model arbitrarily closely by a discrete-state  DP 
model (Bertsekas and Shreve 1978). In previous work, I have found that the 
DP solution is not very sensitive to the discretization of the state variables and 
that one can obtain a good approximation using fairly coarse grids (Rust 1987). 
In this study, I use a grid size of $1,000 (1968 dollars), which turned out to 
be more than adequate given the two-year time discretization that I ultimately 
adopted. 
The most difficult problem, however,  was construction of good measure- 
ments of latent variables such as health h,, labor search s,, and consumption 
c,. My approach was to use all relevant survey responses to define observable 
indicators that might be regarded as “best approximations” of  the underlying 
latent  variables.  Measurement  of  consumption  proved  to  be  particularly 
challenging, a fact that many economists may find disturbing. Even though the 
RHS asked respondents  to list the amount spent on individual  consumption 
items, in my opinion the list was too incomplete to construct reliable estimates 
of  total consumption.  Since the RHS has much more complete, detailed data 
on income and wealth,2 my approach was to infer c, from the budget equation 
Unfortunately,  the RHS recorded  income only in the even-numbered  years 
immediately preceding each survey date. Thus, in order to construct c, I needed 
to impute income in odd-numbered years. This in turn necessitated construc- 
tion of complete labor force histories for each worker, including total annual 
hours worked in each year.3 Using hours worked together with annual wage 
earnings data from the SSER (available up to  1974), I was able to impute 
income in odd-numbered years and construct estimates of c, over the two-year 
sample interval. A limitation of  the income data is absence of information on 
capital gains. I dealt with this problem by attributing 100  percent of the change 
in house value to capital gains (provided the respondent was a homeowner and 
had  not  moved  within  the  interval)  and  by  excluding  workers  who  had 
substantial real estate or equity holdings. I faced equally difficult problems 
constructing  h, and st, but  I will defer the details of their construction  until 
later. 
Good measurements of {x,, d,} are absolutely critical to the success of the 
DP model  since it is highly nonlinear in variables  and there currently  is no 
good theory of  errors in variables for such models. Wherever possible, I have 
attempted to obtain independent measures of the variables to assess the magni- 
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“flag  variables”  to  indicate  the  degree  of  confidence  in  each  of  the 
constructed state and control variables. By setting the appropriate flags, I can 
screen out questionable cases to obtain a core subsample for which confidence 
in  the  data  is  relatively  high.  To  guard  against  the  possibility  that  such 
screening could produce unpredictable sample selection biases,  I have com- 
pared  the distribution of each variable to its distribution  in the  full sample 
using  all available observations.  Because presentation  of  tabulations of  the 
flag variables takes us too much into the  “guts”  of  the computer programs 
that  generate  the  state  variables,  I  have  decided  against  presenting  them. 
Instead, I describe the nature of any special data or sample selection problems 
where appr~priate.~ 
I can state the major conclusions of the data analysis as follows. 
1. At the aggregate level, the data show workers making a smooth transition 
from work into retirement, gradually reducing consumption and labor supply 
but maintaining wealth levels intact. This is consistent with the behavior of a 
neoclassical, risk-averse consumer who attempts to smooth consumption and 
leisure streams and to provide bequests to his heirs. However, at the individual 
level, the data are anything but smooth: measured consumption shows erratic 
fluctuations,  and  labor supply has an abrupt discontinuity,  with  the typical 
worker staying at his full-time job up until retirement age (62-65), at which 
time he applies for Social Security, quits his job, and remains out of the labor 
force for the rest of  his life. 
2. Constructing consumption expenditures from the budget equation, c, = 
W, -  w,  +  + y,  , is susceptible to frequent and often large measurement errors 
in wealth,  possibly exacerbated by  absence of good information on capital 
gains. The majority of the erratic variations in measured consumption appear 
to be attributable simply to response errors in wealth. 
3. The distribution of real wealth changes is centered about zero, but with 
a large variance.  On average, net worth is not very large, about four times 
annual income, and a substantial fraction of this wealth, 50-60 percent, is tied 
up in housing. These facts provide additional support for the view that the large 
swings  in  measured  consumption  are simply a result of  response  errors in 
wealth rather than erratic consumptiodsavings behavior.  Although a simple 
test of the null hypothesis H,,: c, = yt  versus HA:  c, # y,  rejects at the 5 percent 
level (but not at the 1 percent level), the fact that the average change in wealth 
is  $-658  with  a  standard  deviation  of  $47,015 makes  it  very  hard  to 
distinguish  between  alternative  theories  of  consumption/savings  behavior. 
Because  of  the  problems  involved  in  accurately  measuring  wealth  and 
therefore consumption,  I have opted to start with a simpler DP model based 
on the hypothesis that c, = y,.  In this model, workers choose  labor  force 
participation strategies to maximize the expected discounted value of the utility 
of  income, abstracting from wealth  and bequests. 
4. Although respondent’s total income is recorded only for even-numbered 
years, the existence of independent income measures in the SSER and SSMBR 
data sets allowed me to construct reliable income imputations in odd-numbered 322  John Rust 
years.  Thus,  if  wealth  changes are  indeed  an  insignificant  component of 
consumption, total  imputed  income will  be  a good measure  of  actual con- 
~umption.~ 
5. The distribution  of total annual hours worked is highly bimodal, with 
most of its mass at either 0 or 2000. While some of this bimodality is likely 
an artifact of response error (with workers simply rounding their responses to 
forty hourdweek, fifty weekdyear), it does indicate that the tripartite classi- 
fication of  labor force status e, into 1 = full time, 2 = part time, or 3  = un- 
employed does not grossly misrepresent the data and that the measure is robust 
to fairly  large  variations  in  the  hours  cutoffs  defining  the  three  e, states. 
Overall, the  distributions  provide little  evidence to  support the  view  that 
workers treat annual hours of  work as a continuous decision variable. 
6. A  systematic  response  error  problem  known  as  the  seam  problem 
produces  exaggerated  estimates of  labor  state transitions  across the survey 
dates, or seams, of the RHS. This leads to artificial cyclical variations in the 
transition  probabilities  for ‘  ‘across-seam’’  transitions  as compared to  “be- 
tween-seam’’ transitions.  The variation is apparently due to imperfect recall 
of  labor force history  in  the  earlier  year of  the two-year  interview  frame, 
leading to inconsistencies  between  recalled labor force status in the current 
interview and the labor force status reported in  the last interview.  One can 
ameliorate  the seam problem by  “skipping  over the seams”  and  tracking 
transitions between the even-numbered years immediately preceding the odd- 
year  survey  dates in  order to reduce  the  amount of  recall  on the part of 
respondents.  This convinced me to formulate a DP model with a time period 
of two years rather than with a more fine-grained model with a one-year time 
period. 
7. There are three possible measures of the “job search” control variable: 
SR, self-reported planned hours of work in the year following the survey; NE, 
actual hours worked in the year following the survey; and PC, actual hours 
worked  in  the  year  following  the  subsequent  survey.  The  last  measure 
corresponds to a “perfect control” model wherein an unemployed worker who 
decides to go back to work is successful with probability one. This analysis 
focuses on the other two measures, which correspond to “imperfect control” 
models where unemployed workers who decide to look for a full-time job have 
less than a 100 percent chance of being successful. Probably reflecting the fact 
that “talk is cheap,” it appears that the first measure of s,  is a much more noisy 
measure of  actual job search behavior than is the second measure. The data 
show that  the second  measure  allows for a  more intuitive  and predictable 
relation between job search decisions and subsequent employment outcomes. 
8. The four-way  classification  of  health  status h, into  1 = good health, 
2 = health limitation but not disabled, 3  = disabled, and 4 = dead seems to 
produce  sensible  results  despite the  inherently  subjective  nature  of  health 
status. Use of actual benefits paid  from the SSMBR data was critical to the 
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the occurrence of health state 3 owing to systematic underreporting of Social 
Security disability receipts by respondents. The Social Security requirement of 
doctor examination for disability qualification seems to be a significant factor 
in  identifying  individuals  with  substantially  greater  health  problems  as 
indicated by their significantly higher ex post mortality. An unfortunate aspect 
of the disability classification is the fact that no workers become disabled after 
age 62. This is an artifact of Social Security rules that automatically convert 
disability payments into OASI payments after age 62.6 
9. The SSMBR data allow me to identify when individuals actually apply 
for and receive OASI benefits.  Thirty percent of eligible recipients apply for 
benefits as soon as they are able to receive them at the early retirement age 62, 
and another 30 percent apply for benefits  at the normal  retirement  age 65. 
Overall, nearly all nondisabled workers apply for and receive Social Security 
retirement benefits  between the ages of  62 and 65. The implied retirement 
hazard and frequency distributions  computed using the SSMBR data and a 
definition  of  “retirement”  as the  age of  first entitlement  to OASDI  differ 
significantly  from the distributions computed by other researchers using the 
RHS data and other definitions of retirement. In order better to understand the 
phenomenon of  early retirement and the pronounced bimodal distribution of 
retirement dates, I have incorporated a new control variable sr, defined by 
0 if worker has not applied for OASI, 
1 if worker first applied for OASI 
before age 65 (early retirement), 
2 if worker first applied for OASI  i  after age 65 (normal retirement), 
(2)  sr, = 
and corresponding control variable ss,  defined by 
(3)  ss, = 
1 if  worker applies for Social Security benefits, 
{  0 if  worker does not apply for Social Security benefits.’ 
Including sr, and ss,  allows me to avoid ad hoc definitions of  “retirement,” 
separating the analysis of retirement behavior (i.e., collection of OASI) from 
labor supply behavior. 
11.2  Estimation of Worker’s Beliefs: Main Findings 
The DP model represents workers’ beliefs about uncertain future events by 
a Markov transition probability density IT(X,+ llx,, d,).  Under the assumption of 
homogeneity  and  rational  expectations,  one can  “uncover”  these  beliefs 
from data on the realizations of {x,, d,}. Given the discretization of time and 
state variables proposed in section 1  1.1, IT  is a matrix with approximately 130 
million  elements.  Even with my comparatively large data set of over thirty 
thousand observations on {xi,  d,}, the standard nonparametric estimate of IT  is 324  John Rust 
out of the question since nearly all cells of fr  would be estimated as identically 
zero even though workers might believe that the corresponding transitions 
occur with positive probability. Nonparametric approaches such as kernel and 
nearest-neighbor regressions also have problems since their estimates of  IT 
depend critically on  arbitrary choices of  kernel,  window-width, and  other 
smoothing parameters whose  proper  values  I  have  little intuition about.* 
My approach is to find a parametric specification  ~(x,  +  lx, ,  d,  , 0)  that depends 
on a much lower-dimensional vector of unknown parameters 8  in such a way 
that  all relevant cells  of  7~ are  assigned nonzero probabilities.  It  is  also 
important to choose a specification  that is parsimonious yet sufficiently flexible 
so that the estimated model is consistent with the data. Above all, it is crucial 
that the estimated beliefs are “sensible”  if  we  expected to get  “sensible” 
estimates of  workers’ preferences. 
Direct parameterization of a 130 million element matrix seems out of  the 
question, so a more clever approach must be employed. The strategy I have 
followed is  to  decompose T  into  a  product  of  conditional and  marginal 
densities and estimate each of  the components separately. To  see this more 
clearly, note that without loss of  generality one can decompose a bivariate 
transition density f  as follows: 
where fl ,  fi ,  3,, and f4 are defined from f  in an obvious way. Although (4) 
shows that the ordering of the decomposition off is irrelevant, it does make 
a difference when the functional form off must be estimated from the data, 
especially where  data measurement problems can  lead  to  decompositions 
which exhibit “spurious causality.” Having tried various decompositions of IT, 
the one I found most plausible is given below 
Note that the decomposition (5) excludes the state and control variables c,,  w,, 
aw, from the original list presented in section 11.1. Consumption c,  and wealth 
w, were excluded because of the measurement problems discussed in conclu- 
sion 3 of  section 11.1. The Social Security average monthly  wage aw, (a 
complex average of  the worker’s historical earnings) was excluded since it 
turned out to be sufficiently collinear with current income  yt  that I could reduce 
the dimensionality of the model by making yr  do double duty as a proxy for 325  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
aw,. Finally, future age a,+, and Social Security status sr,+, were excluded 
since with probability one they obey trivial nonstochastic  transition rules: 
ar+l  = a, + 2, 
sr,, I  = sr, 
sr,,,  = 1  if sr, = 0, ss, = 1, a, < 65, a, 2 62, 
sr,,,  = 2  if sr, = 0, ss,  = 1,  a, 
if sr,  0, 
65. 
The motivation for the decomposition of n given in (5) is that income y, and 
employment status e, are the most important state variables of the DP model, 
and therefore their evolution should be predicted as well as possible. If we view 
(5) as specifying TT  as a direct product of individual transition matrices, then 
nY  is the  “innermost”  component of  the  direct product, in the  sense that 
income transitions are conditioned on the contemporaneously  realized values 
of  all the remaining state variables. From an empirical standpoint, including 
these contemporaneous values substantially  improves the fit of  the income 
regressions estimated in section  11.8. 
The  outermost  component  of  the  direct  product,  health  status  h,,  has 
additional structure resulting from the definition of health states h, = 3 and 
h, = 4. If I fix the values of the other variables (y,,  e,, ms,,  a, ,d,), then nh 
represented by the 4  x  4 transition probability  matrix: 
According to (6), death is treated as an absorbing state. Note that disability is 
also treated as an absorbing state in the sense that, once a worker becomes 
disabled, he can only continue to stay disabled or die. This restriction  was 
necessitated by data limitations. Although the Social Security SSMBR data set 
includes the variable  “date of  termination of disability benefits,”  there were 
only a handful of cases where actual termination was observed. Perhaps this 
indicates problems in Social Security record keeping, but it is more likely just 
an artifact of my Social Security-based  definition of “disability.”  According 
to Social Security rules, disabled workers who receive SSDI benefits past age 
62 are automatically reassigned OASI benefits after turning 62. Thus, there is 
no real incentive for Social Security to keep track of the date when the actual 
physical disability terminates once the worker is older than 62. One can try to 
partially  rectify  the  problem  the  following  way:  reclassify  workers  who 
received disability benefits prior to age 62 and who are now older than 62 and 
reporting that they  are in good health  as being  in state h, = 1 rather  than 326  John Rust 
h, = 3.  Unfortunately,  this  reclassification  schcme has its  own problems: 
although  it  allows  transitions  from  disability  to  good  health  (h, = 3 to 
h,,,  = l),  there  is  no  way  to  record  transitions  from  h, = 3  to 
h,, , =  2 since the RHS variables do not allow us to distinguish between the 
states “existence of a health problem  that limits one’s ability to work”  and 
‘‘disability.’ ’ 
The remaining sections of the paper discuss the construction of the state and 
control variables in more detail and present estimation results for each of  the 
four components of the decomposition of T  given in (5). Having conducted an 
extensive specification search to find an appropriate functional form for T,  I 
can summarize the main findings below. 
1. Age and income are relatively unimportant determinants  of death rates 
after  controlling  for  health,  employment,  and  marital  status.  Death  rates 
decrease slightly with income and actually decrease with age until age 67.9  Not 
surprisingly, single workers are significantly more likely to die than married 
workers. However, even this variable has a small effect relative to health h, and 
the labor supplyketirement decision  (s,,  ss,).  Workers who are in poor health 
(h, =  2, 3)  are two to four times more likely to die than healthy workers. 
There is an equally strong association between the job search decision s, and 
the probability of death, but the nature of the relation depends critically on the 
worker’s  health  and  retirement  status. If  the worker  is  retired  or disabled 
(h =  3 or ss E {  1, 2}),  any attempt to return to work on either a full- or a 
part-time basis  is extremely  hazardous, significantly  increasing  the  risk  of 
death. However, if the worker has not already retired and is in relatively good 
health  (h  E (1, 2) and ss = 0),  the decision to quit work  is associated  with 
significantly higher  death  rates.  Although  this  latter  finding  may  represent 
spurious causality because of failure completely to control for all dimensions 
of health status, from the standpoint of  a worker behaving according to the DP 
model the association is necessarily  interpreted as cause and effect. 
2. The probability of  becoming disabled is a sharply decreasing function of 
age, a result that is an artifact of the definition of  disability discussed above. 
It is clear that disability is an endogenous state variable (i.e., the outcome of 
an unmodeled underlying decision process), as evidenced by the fact that the 
probability of becoming disabled decreases well before age 62. The explana- 
tion is that the process involved in applying and qualifying for SSDI  imposes 
significant costs on the worker, including doctor examination at the worker’s 
expense. Naturally, the closer one is to the early retirement age of 62, the less 
incentive one has to incur the costs of applying for SSDI, especially when the 
probability of  qualification is significantly less than one. Given the difficulty 
of constructing a sensible “objective”  measure of  disability, and given the fact 
that by law disabled workers have essentially  no further labor supplyiretire- 
ment  decisions,  lo  I  have  decided  to  treat  disabilityideath  as  a  combined 
absorbing state since the certification standards appear successfully to identify 
a group of workers who have serious health problems, as confirmed by expost 
mortality rates which are twice as high as for nondisabled workers. Another 327  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
finding of  interest is the fact that both single and higher-income workers are 
significantly less likely to become disabled.  * ’ 
3. The probability of being in good health is a declining function of age and 
an increasing function of income. All other things being equal, marital status 
has no significant effect on the probability of being in good health. By far the 
most  important  determinant  of  future  health  is  current  health.  Currently 
healthy workers are three times more likely to be in good health than currently 
unhealthy  workers (h, = 2).  There is weak evidence that continuing to work 
on a full- or part-time basis is associated with a higher probability of being in 
good  health.  Conversely,  the decision  to quit working is associated with  a 
deterioration  in  health.  This  result  is  corroborated  by  the  fact  that  retired 
workers, sr E { 1, 2},  are significantly less likely to be in good health. As with 
my comments in point  1, the association might indicate spurious causality due 
to imperfections in the measure of  health  status: healthier workers continue 
working,  while unhealthy workers quit and retire. 
4. By  far the  most  important  variable predicting  future marital  status is 
current marital status: an older single worker has less than a 7 percent chance 
of finding a new mate over the two-year survey period. Older workers are more 
likely  to lose their  spouse, while  higher-income  workers  are less likely  to 
become single, at least up to an income of $30,000. There is weak evidence 
that, among single workers, the worse one’s health, the more likely one is to 
remain  single, although  unhealthy married workers have a higher chance of 
remaining married. Economic decisions such as the labor search decision s,  or 
the retirement decision ss, appear to have little or no effect on future marital 
status. 
5. As one would  expect, future employment status e,,,  is most strongly 
affected  by  the employment  search decision  st.’*  In addition,  the  worker’s 
previous  employment  state e, has a significant  effect on probability  that the 
search decision s, is realized.  Thus, currently employed workers who decide 
to continue  working full time have  a higher probability  of  remaining  fully 
employed than part-time or unemployed workers. Interestingly, unemployed 
workers  appear to have a significantly  higher chance of  being successful in 
gaining a full-time job than part-time employed workers. If a worker decides 
not  to work,  he  is more likely to  “realize”  his decision  if  he is currently 
unemployed  than  if  he  had  a full-  or part-time  job.  Full-time  workers  are 
more  likely  to  realize  their  quit  decisions  than  part-time workers.  Health 
status  also has  a  very  strong  effect  on  employment  status.  Workers  who 
become disabled are two and a half times more likely to be out of  the labor 
force,  and their chances of staying in a full-time job are less than one-third 
that of nondisabled  workers.  There are clear aging effects on the ability to 
continue working full time; for example, the  probability  that a 67-year-old 
worker  will  be  successful  in  keeping  or  finding  a  full-time  job  is  only 
one-third as high as that of an equivalent worker under 60. Income appears to 
be  a  statistically  significant  proxy  for  employability,  with  high-income 
workers being  60 percent more likely to keep or obtain a full-time job than 328  John Rust 
low-income workers. Somewhat surprisingly, changes in marital status have 
no significant effect  on employment status. Less surprising  is the fact that 
workers  who are receiving  OASI are less  likely  to be fully  employed and 
more likely to be unemployed, all other things equal. 
6. In order to match the long-tailed cross-sectional income distributions, the 
stochastic process for income was assumed to have a transition density with 
a  conditionally  heteroscedastic  lognormal  distribution.  Income is  strongly 
autocorrelated with an autoregressive coefficient of  .95, and there is evidence 
of nonlinearity in this relation in the sense that higher powers of current income 
yr enter the model with highly significant coefficients. The higher powers of 
yr  were needed primarily to enable the model to fit the complicated patterns of 
conditional heteroscedasticity  that exist in the data. The estimated model has 
a variance  of  future  income yr+]  that  is  an  increasing  function  of  current 
income, but the relation is far from proportional: a worker earning $50,000  has 
a standard deviation in yt+  I  of  $12,000, whereas a worker earning $5,000 has 
a standard deviation in yr+  of $2,000. Health status has a significant effect on 
income prospects: healthy workers expect a 3 percent increase in real income, 
and disabled workers expect a 5 percent increase in income. However,  cur- 
rently  healthy  workers  who become disabled  expect a  20  percent  drop in 
income. Changes in marital status have large and statistically significant effects 
on income. A worker who loses his wife expects a 25 percent drop in income, 
and a bachelor who has no prospects of remarriage expects his income to fall 
by about 20 percent. However, by far the most important determinant of future 
income  yr+, is  the  worker’s  employment  status/search decision  (et, s,). 
Workers who keep working at their full-time jobs expect a 20 percent increase 
in income, while workers who exit from the labor force expect a 20-30  percent 
decrease  in  income.  The estimated  income process  successfully  captures 
the main features of OASDI benefit rules, including the regressive nature of 
the payoffs, the extra benefits to a spouse, the early retirement penalty, and the 
effect of the “earnings test”  for workers under 70. 
7. It is possible  that there exist unmeasured  differences or heterogeneity 
among workers that create systematic differences in workers’ beliefs but that 
are not captured in the list of state and control variables set forth in this paper. 
In order to assess the potential magnitude of this problem, I included several 
demographic variables  in the estimation  of  workers’  beliefs  IT, including  a 
variable classifying the respondent  as a “work lover”  or “leisure lover”  as 
well as his education, race, and the industry and occupation of his longest held 
job. Surprisingly, except for the finding that blacks expect significantly lower 
incomes  than  whites,  none  of  these  variables  had  a  major effect  on  the 
estimated transition probability  7i.  Thus, the available evidence indicates that 
the  list of  state and  control  variables  set  forth  in  this  paper  provides  a 
reasonably complete set of ‘‘sufficient statistics” for the states and decisions 
of my sample of  workers. In particular,  there is no compelling evidence that 
the failure to account for unmeasured heterogeneity  leads to a gross misrep- 
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The  remaining  sections  of  the  paper  present  the  numerical  evidence 
supporting the conclusions drawn in sections 11.1  and 11.2 and can be skipped 
or skimmed by readers who are willing to accept them at face value. 
11.3  Analysis of Age, Marital Status, and Demographic Variables 
A set of  variables that we ought to be able to measure accurately are the 
identity of the respondent,  his or her age,  and basic demographic  variables 
such  as  race,  education,  and  the  occupatiodindustry  of  the  respondents' 
longest job. By and large this is true of the RHS data, although cross-checks 
of  self-reported values with Census and Social Security records do indicate 
discrepancies.  For example, out of  an initial  1969 sample of  8,131 males, 
reported and recorded Census date of birth differed by more than one year in 
fifty-three cases, in some cases by more than ten years. In order to estimate 
the DP model, I need to track each of the 8,131 original male respondents over 
the  ten-year  survey  period.  RHS  respondent  identifiers  allowed  me  to 
distinguish the original male respondent from his surviving spouse (or other 
household members), and, in conjunction with comprehensive death records 
compiled  by  Paul  Taubman,  I  was  able to determine  whether  the  original 
respondent died, even if he was no longer responding to the survey. Table 11. I 
provides a response summary that shows that the basic sample of original male 
respondents  decreased  from  8,131 in  1969 to  4,298 in  1979.  There  was 
significant  attrition  of the original  1969 male respondents  over the  survey. 
Table 11.1 shows that the attrition was due to the respondent's  death in 2,327 
cases  and  nonresponse  in  1,506 cases.  A  discrepancy  exists  between  the 
individual subrecord identifier in the SSER tapes and the respondent identifiers 
on the original RHS tapes: the former showed 8,091 original respondents in 
1971 versus 7,054 in the RHS. The former figure could not possibly be right 
given that 433 respondents had died by the 1971 interview. Indeed, a second 
cross-check  using  the  Census  nonresponse  filei5 agreed  with  the  RHS 
identifiers. This provided a sobering reminder that one cannot necessarily trust 
the SSA's internal accounting data more than the RHS interview data. 
Relatively  minor  discrepancies  exist  in  the  data  on marital  status.  For 
example, nine individuals reported being married with spouse not present in 
Table 11.1  RHS Response Summary 
71  73  75  77  79 
Original '69 male respondent responds  7,054  6,239  5,541  4,811  4,298 
No response,  '69 respondent still alive  534  889  1,104  1,315  1,426 
No  response,  '69 respondent dead  152  361  610  917  1,245 
Surviving spouse responds, '69  respondent dead  244  488  722  908  1,075 
Other relation responds,  '69 respondent alive  110  96  100  120  80 
Total  8,131  8,131  8,131  8,131  8,131 
Other relation responds, '69 respondent dead  37  58  54  60  7 330  John Rust 
1969 but  reported having  never been  married  in  1971; two cases reported 
having a deceased spouse in  1969 and never having been married  in  1971. 
Thirty-five cases classified themselves as being a surviving spouse in 1971 but 
listed themselves as having a  “spouse  in  ’69 but not in  ’71”  instead of the 
correct response, “’69 spouse deceased, no ’71 spouse.”  Using the corrected 
marital status data, I defined the marital state variable ms,  as follows: 
1 if respondent  is married, 
2 if respondent  is widowed, separated, divorced, or never married.  ms, = 
Table  1 1.2 presents  the computed two-state  Markov transition  matrices  for 
marital  status  (where M denotes  cases that  are missing  owing to death or 
nonresponse). The transition matrices change in the expected way over time: 
the  probability  of  becoming  a  widower  over  the  two-year  survey  frame 
increases  from 6 percent  in  1969 to 9 percent  in  1977. The probability  of 
remarriage decreases over time from 7 percent in 1969 to 2 percent in 1977. 
Table  11.3 presents  the  estimation  results  for  nnzs,  the  marital  status 
component of the decomposition of n given in (5). The elements of T,,,~  were 
estimated  by  maximum  likelihood, using  a  linear-in-parameters,  binomial 
logit specification of the probability that ms,, ,  =  2.16  The estimation results 
Table 11.2  Markov Transition Matrices for Marital Status 
Transition 
Cell Counts  Probabilities 
Year of 
Transition  1  2  M  Total  %  I  2 
1969- 7 1  : 
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1915-77: 
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4,194  72 
1,705  28 
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Table 11.3  Estimates of Marital Status Transition Probability 
(dependent variable: I{rn~,+~  = 2)) 
Variable  Estimate  ?-statistic 
s,  = 1 
s,  = 3 
ms, = 2, h,,,  =  1 
ms, = 2, h,,,  = 2 
ms, = 2, h,,,  = 3 
ms, = 1, h,,,  = 1 
ms, =  I, h,,,  = 2 
ms, = 1, h,,,  = 3 
a, 
Y, 
Yr . Yt 
ss, E {l, 21 
ss, E {I, 2},  ms, = 2 
Log likelihood 
Grad - direc 
Correctly predicted (%) 
Total observations 
-  .05 
.08 
-  1.87 
-  2.05 













-  .3 
-  .6 
-  1.6 





-  1.0 
8.5 
-7.1 
-  .8 
.I 
in table  11.3 are based on a smaller subsample than table 11.2 (18,833 vs. 
34,773 observations) as a result of conditioning on the availability of complete 
observations for the state and control variables entering nm,  and conditioning 
on a sample Boolean variable. The Boolean excludes respondents who are not 
the original 1969 male respondents and further excludes respondents who are 
farmers or farm owners, respondents  with  significant  pension  wealth, and 
respondents  who  made  sufficiently  erroneous  or  suspicious  responses  as 
determined  from the flag  variables  described  in  section  11.1. Overall, the 
estimation results in table  11.3 support the conclusions drawn in point 4 of 
section 11.2. 
11.4  Health Status 
A key variable in the DP model is the worker’s health status. This variable 
shifts the worker’s mortality hazard and affects his ability to work and enjoy 
leisure.  In order to construct the health status variable, I used mortality data 
from  Paul  Taubman’s  “death  tape”  and  a  battery  of  over  seventy-five 
questions on health status in the RHS. It turned out, however, that two of  the 
seventy-five RHS health variables  were most relevant for classifying  health 
status:  HLIM,  “Do  you  have  any  health  condition, physical  handicap, or 
disability that limits how  well you get around?”  and HWRK, “Does your 
health limit the kind or amount of work or housework you can do?” Originally, 
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the respondent’s report as to whether he received  SSDI benefits,  to classify 
health  status h, into one of  four states:  1  = respondent  is in  good  health, 
2 = respondent  has a health  problem that  limits  his  ability to work  or get 
around  but  is  not  severe  enough  for  the  worker  to  qualify  for  SSDI, 
3 = respondent  has a health problem severe enough for him to qualify for 
SSDI, and 4  = respondent is dead. My original construction of  this variable 
yielded significantly lower estimates of  the probability of being on SSDI than 
those  of  Bound  (1986):  1.17 percent  in  1969 versus  Bound’s  estimate of 
7.1 percent for men aged 55-64  in  1970. In addition, the data appeared to 
show an unexpected  mass outbreak of poor health in  1975, with only  1,254 
respondents classified as h, = 1 and 3,958 classified as h, = 2. By using the 
SSMBR OASDI payments data, I was able to directly verify whether a worker 
was classified as disabled by  SSA by  determining whether  he qualified for 
SSDI payments. Furthermore, analysis of  the health input variables revealed 
that  the  HWRK  variable  had  5,956 missing  values  in  1975 and  that  the 
remaining cases contained a disproportionate percentage of workers reporting 
a health limitation (1,476 out of 2,200). This turned out to be an artifact of 
a survey skip pattern introduced in 1975 that was different from skip patterns 
in other survey years: HWRK75 was asked only if respondent was in the labor 
force, whereas in other survey years the HWRK question was not conditioned 
on being in the labor force. I  “fixed”  the problem by using only the HLlM 
variable to classify workers into health state h  = 1 or h  = 2 and merging the 
disability data from the SSMBR to classify disabled workers h = 3. 
Another problem arose from the fact that the RHS survey did not attempt 
to track  workers  who became institutionalized;  it  simply records  them  as 
missing.  There is good reason to believe that the failure to track institution- 
alized workers induces a sample selection bias since single workers are less 
likely to have a family support network to rely on and are therefore more likely 
to  become  institutionalized  and  be  lost from  the  sample.  To  correct this 
problem, I merged data from the Census nonresponse file, which records the 
reasons  for nonresponse,  including  institutionalization.  Analysis of  health 
status of the institutionalized workers showed that among the sample of  113 
institutionalized workers (36 percent of who were single in 1969 as compared 
to 13  percent for the sample as a whole), in only one case did the worker return 
to the  RHS  sample with  improved  health:  the  preponderant  majority  of 
institutionalized workers died within a few years after entering the institution. 
Based on this evidence, I decided to redefine health state 4 as an absorbing state 
for workers who are either dead, disabled, or institutionalized. 
A  final  problem was  more  difficult  to resolve.  Although  I  have  fairly 
complete data on the month and year that a worker died, in order to be included 
in the estimation of the health transition probability matrix, I must observe the 
worker’s  state and control vector  (xl,  d,) in the survey period  immediately 
preceding  his death. Unfortunately,  there are many cases where the worker 
failed to respond to the survey for two or more survey periods preceding his 
death. Analysis of these cases shows that a disproportionate number consist 333  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
of single men. One solution is to “remove”  the intervening periods of missing 
data by treating the death as occuring just after the last survey to which the 
worker responded.  Unfortunately, this approach has the effect of  “accelerat- 
ing” the deaths of a fairly large group of workers, distorting the estimates of 
age-death profiles.  I decided, therefore,  to leave the data as they  were and 
simply acknowledge the possibility of sample selection bias that might lead to 
an underestimate of  mortality rates for single workers. 
Table 11.4 displays the transition probability matrices for my final definition 
of  h,. The data show a much more reasonable rate of disability receipt,  8.1 
percent  in  1969, which is much closer to Bound’s estimate.  The transition 
matrices generally appear to be quite reasonable, with workers in worse health 
states having significantly higher risk of death and disability. Mortality rates 
appear fairly stable over time and are in rough agreement with independent 
Table 11.4  Health Transition Probabilities 
Cell Counts  Transition Probabilities 














































630  111  211 
790  84  116 
0  506  106 
000 
730  76  181 
688  51  126 
0  533  113 
000 
707  20  177 
831  12  149 
0  541  89 
000 
510  0  164 
877  2  171 
0  454  92 
000 
540  0  131 
867  0  158 
0  359  73 
000 
470  5,769 
147  1,699 
46  658 
0  0 
8,126  100 
296  4,912 
107  1,421 
56  702 
0  0 
7,035  100 
240  4,119 
76  1,439 
38  668 
0  0 
6,226  100 
217  3,386 
87  1,559 
43  589 
0  0 
5,534  100 
130  2,934 
60  1,401 
27  459 
0  4 
4,798  100 
71  82  12  2 
21  36  51  5 
8  0  083 
0000 
70  79  16  1 
20  34  52  4 
10  0  0  83 
0000 
66  77  18  1 
23  27  61  1 
11  0  0  86 
0000 
61  79  16  0 
28  29  59  1 
11  0  0  83 
0000 
61  76  19  0 
29  23  65  0 
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estimates calculated by Mott and Haurin (1985) using NLS data. Note that the 
transition probabilities in table 11.4 imply that disability is an absorbing state: 
once  a  worker  becomes  disabled,  he  either  remains  disabled,  becomes 
institutionalized,  or dies. This is simply a reflection  of  the data limitations 
discussed  in  section  11.2:  the  SSMBR  data  do  not  record  the  date  of 
termination of disability. As a result, in each survey year there are approxi- 
mately one hundred workers who report that they have no health problem that 
limited their ability to work or get around despite the fact that Social Security 
records indicate that they are disabled. Because the existing classification of 
disability confirms my a priori belief that disabled workers have significantly 
higher  mortality  rates,  and,  more  important,  because  this  classification 
matches the aggregate  disability rates compiled  by  Bound, I decided not to 
reclassify these workers as h, =  1. 
Another apparent contradiction exists between CensusiSocial Security death 
records, the RHS death records, and the death records independently compiled 
by Paul Taubman. The RHS date of death differs from that in Taubman’s data 
in thirty-six cases, which in turn differs from the Census and Social Security 
death date (from the SSMBR tape) in 302 cases. Case-by-case cross-checks 
resolved  the  discrepancies between  Taubman’s  data and  RHS,  and  cross- 
checks of  Taubman’s  data  with  the  Census data reveal  that  in  285  cases 
Taubman’s data recorded the respondent as dead while Census and SSA had 
no record  of  death. Individual  cross-checks reveal  that Taubman’s data are 
probably right in these cases. In fact, one can identify at least twenty-six cases 
of apparently fraudulent behavior involving a surviving spouse who continued 
to collect both her and her husband’s OASI benefits even though the husband 
had  been  deceased for several  years.”  The final  death  data  that  I  used  to 
construct the health variable are Taubman’s original data, edited in approxi- 
mately sixty cases where case-by-case examinations revealed that either the 
RHS or the SSMBR death date was correct. 
I conclude this section with tables  1 1.5- 1 1.7, which present the estimates 
of  the transition  probabilities  for health, disability,  and death, respectively. 
Each of the transition probabilities was specified to have linear-in-parameters 
binomial logit functional  forms. Products of  the estimated probability  func- 
tions can be multiplied out to compute the estimated health transition matrix, 
+,,.  The interpretation of  the estimation results has been listed in points  1, 2, 
and 3 of section 11.2 and will not be repeated here. However, in order to get 
more  intuition  about  how  workers  believe  their health  declines  with  age, 
I  present  figure  11.1,  which  shows  pr{h,+  = 1  la,}, pr{h, +  =  ~Iu,},  and 
pr{h,+ I =  41a,}, respectively. 
The age-health  profile  graph  in figure  11.1 shows the  probability  of  re- 
maining  in good health  as a function  of  age for four configurations  of  the 
remaining state variables.  All four curves show that health declines with age; 
however, changes in the other variables have a stronger effect on health than 
age alone. The top two curves (marked with circles and squares) represent the 
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Table 11.5  Estimates of  Health Transition Probability 
(dependent variable Z{ht+, = 1)) 
Variable  Estimate  r-statistic 
h, =  I, s, =  I 
h, =  1,  s,  = 2 
h, =  1, s, = 3 
h, = 2, s, =  1 
h, = 2, s,  = 2 
h, = 2, s, = 3 
a, 
Yr 
Yr  Yt 
ms, = 2 
ss, E 11,  2) 
Log likelihood 
Grad  direc 
Correctly predicted (%) 
Total observations 
-2.28 
-  2.15 
-  1.84 
-  .I3 
-  .21 
.20 
.01 










-  3.7 
-  .2 







Table 11.6  Estimates of Disability Hazard Function 
(dependent variable: I{ht+, = 3}) 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic 
Constant 
h, =  1,  s,  =  1 
h, =  1, s,  = 3 
h, = 2, s,  = 1 
h, = 2, s,  = 2 
h, = 2, s,  = 3 
a, 
YI 
a,  Yr 
ms, = 2 
Log likelihood 
Grad  direc 




-  .39 
-  .65 
-  .73 
-  .95 
.51 
.41 
.  00 
.73 




-  12.7 
2.2 
-  1.0 
-  2.0 
-  1.7 





at ages 62 and 65, respectively  (the latter worker also has  10 percent higher 
income). The bottom curve represents the health expectations of a worker who 
is in poor health, h, = 2, and who retires  at age 62. The remaining curve, 
marked with  x’s, shows  the health  expectations of  a healthy  worker  who 
continued to work until age 70, at which time he fell ill (h, = 2),  quit his job, 
and began  collecting  OASI. The combination of  all these events at age 70 
produced  a dramatic downturn in the worker’s health outlook. 336  John Rust 
’Ihble 11.7  Estimates of  Mortality Hazard Function 
(dependent variable: I{hz + ,  = 4}) 
Variable  Estimate  ?-statistic 
~~ 
h, =  I, s,  =  1 
h, =  1, s,  = 2 
h, = 2, sI  =  1 
b,  2, s,  = 2 
h, = 2.  s,  = 3 
h, = 3, s, =  1 
h, = 3, s, = 2 
h, = 3. s, = 3 
Yr 
a, E [O,  60) 
a, E [60, 62) 
a, E [62, 65) 
a, E [65, 68) 
a, E [68, 71) 
a, 2  71 
ms, = 2 
h, =  1.  s,  =  I, ss, E {1, 2) 
h, =  1, s,  = 2, ssI E (1. 2) 
h, =  1, s,  = 3, ss, E {I, 2) 
h, = 2, s,  =  I, ss,  E (1, 2) 
h, = 2, s,  = 2, ss, E {I, 2) 
h, = 2, s, = 3, ss, E {I. 2) 
Log likelihood 
Grad  direc 
Correctly predicted (%) 






-  1.83 
-  .93 
-  .33 
.O1 






-  .31 
-  3.15 
-  1.82 
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-  3.40 
-3.14 
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Figure  11.1 also shows the probability of becoming disabled as a function 
of age. In this case, age effects dominate, reflecting sharp declines in workers’ 
incentives to incur the costs of applying for disability benefits as they approach 
the early retirement age, 62. The topmost curve corresponds to a low-income 
married worker who is currently in poor health (h,  = 2),  while the lowest curve 
corresponds to a high-income  single worker who is in good health. 
Finally, figure 11.1 plots the estimated death hazard function. As discussed 
in section  11.2, it was difficult to identify the independent effect of  age on 
death rates.  Both linear and quadratic  specifications of  age effects produced 
ultimately  falling  death  hazards, a result  I  found  implausible.  Using  age 
dummies, I discovered the explanation: the age dummies reveal that workers’ 
death  rates  decrease until  age 67, after  which  they  begin  rising  with  age. 
However, because  the RHS surveyed men  between  58 and 63 in  1969, the 
oldest possible age reached during the survey is 73. This implies that there are 
relatively  few observations beyond  age 67, so that  both  the  linear and  the 
quadratic specifications attempted to fit the downward-sloping part of the death Age  at t  Age  at  t 
A,g e  ~  Death  P rot  i  I es  - 
Age  at t 
Fig. 11.1  Predicted health as a function of age 
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hazard  function  from  age 58 to age 67, ignoring  the  upturn  that  occurred 
afterward  owing  to  a  lack  of  observations.  Unfortunately,  while  the  age 
dummies allow the model to fit the data well, it implies that the risk of death 
is constant after the worker reaches his early 70s. Aggregate mortality statistics 
show (unconditional on health and employment status) that death rates increase 
with age, which implies that a model containing only age dummies from 58 
to 73 will ultimately underpredict death rates. To  correct this,  I added a pure 
age trend to the model in order to match the aggregate mortality statistics from 
age 74 to age 95.  Figure 1  1.1 (which incorporates the age trend after age 73) 
displays mortality expectations for four different workers. The V-shaped curve 
marked  with  circles corresponds  to a  single,  low-income  disabled  worker. 
While  his  death  rate  is  much  higher  than  average,  it  shows  significant 
improvement until age 67, after which it begins to worsen steadily. The bottom 
curve, marked  with  triangles,  shows the  mortality  expectations  of  a high- 
income “workaholic”  who is in good health and who continued working full 
time until his health deteriorated to h, = 2 at age 75, after which he started 
working  part  time. In  spite  of  his  health  problems,  the  workaholic  never 
retired, in the sense of  collecting OASI. The remaining two curves (marked 
with squares and x’s,  respectively) show the death rates of two average-income 
workers who retire at 65 and 70, respectively.  The latter worker retired at 70 
owing to the fact that his wife died and his health deteriorated from h = 1 to 
h = 2; this explains the dramatic increase in  his death rate. 
There are  two  features  of  figure  11.1 that  seem implausible:  the  sharp 
V-shaped  death hazard  for the disabled  worker  and  the  significantly  lower 
death  rates  for the  high-income  “workaholic”  in  comparison  to  the  two 
average-income  workers  who  retired  at  65  and  70. Looking  back  to the 
estimation results in table 1  1.7, it appears that these predictions result from the 
fact that Social Security recipients (sr,  E { 1, 2)) have significantly higher death 
rates. As discussed in conclusion 1 of  section 11.2, this is probably due to the 
fact that h, does not capture all dimensions of health status. Workers who are 
in  worse  health  are  probably  more  likely  to  retire  than  healthy  workers. 
However,  from  the  standpoint of the DP model, the relation  is necessarily 
treated as cause and effect: it implies that collection of OASI can be hazardous 
to your health. To avoid this problem, I reestimated the model without the sr, 
interactions.  While there was a significant  drop in the log-likelihood (from 
-  4,714 to -  5,045), the graph in the lower-right-hand corner of figure  11.1 
shows that the resulting model seems to produce more reasonable predictions. 
In  particular,  the  age  effects  now  show  a  slightly  increasing  rather  than 
decreasing hazard rate, and the gross disparities between the workaholic (who 
never collected OASI) and his average-income colleagues have disappeared. 
Based  on these results,  I  have decided to  exclude the sri interactions in the 
specification of the mortality hazard, even though they clearly improve the fit 
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11.5  Employment Status 
Accurate  classification  of  employment status  e, is the  key  to the entire 
undertaking:  employment  status  is  the  most  important  variable  affecting 
income and utility levels in the DP model and is a crucial input into the income 
imputation routines that construct biennial income. They are also key inputs 
for the construction of biennial consumption expenditures in section 11.7. The 
RHS data set allowed me to construct  three independent  measures of  labor 
force  status:  self-classification  of  employment  status  (SE),  instantaneous 
employment status (IE), and historical  employment status  (E). Each of  the 
measures assumes three values,  1 = full time, 2  = part time, and 3 = not 
employed. The SE variable was directly recorded  in a trichotomous  format 
from the survey question “Do you consider yourself partly retired, completely 
retired, or not retired at all?” The IE measure was determined from the survey 
question  “How many hours per week do you usually work on your current 
job?” Using this response, I defined IE = 1 if the worker worked more than 
twenty-five hours per week, IE = 2 if the worker worked between five and 
twenty-five  hours per  week,  and IE = 3 if  the worker  was  not  currently 
employed or worked less than five hours per week. The historical employment 
status measure  E is an annual measure  based  on the total number of  hours 
worked in the preceding year. I defined E = 1 if the respondent worked more 
than 1,300  hours in the past year, E  = 2 if the respondent worked between 200 
and 1,300 hours, and E = 3 otherwise. Because the worker might have had 
multiple jobs in the two years preceding  the RHS interview, computation of 
total hours worked required direct reconstruction of the underlying continuous- 
time labor force histories from a battery of more than  130 questions in the 
“Work Experience” section of the RHS survey. Previous studies have used the 
IE and SE measures of employment status, probably because they were among 
the easiest variables to pull off the RHS tapes. Constructing retrospective labor 
force histories is a considerably  more complicated undertaking owing to the 
existence of complicated skip patterns in the survey questionnaire and the need 
carefully to account for the beginning and ending dates of jobs when there are 
multiple transitions within the interview frame. To  my knowledge, this is the 
first study to construct complete labor force histories using the RHS data. 
Table 11.8 presents aggregate employment distributions using each of  the 
definitions of employment status. Although there are significant differences 
between the measures, all three confirm conclusion 1 of  section 11.1 that the 
aggregate  data show  workers  making  a  smooth transition  from work into 
retirement. The main differences are that SE appears to overestimate substan- 
tially the occurrence of part-time work relative to the E and IE measures, and 
E appears to overestimate part-time work relative to the IE measure. The latter 
effect is to be expected from the nature of the definition of E: a worker who 
worked  at a full-time job until  mid-year  and then  retired  would  be classi- 340  John Rust 
Table 11.8  Cross-sectional Distributions of Measures of Employment Status 
Historical Employment Status (W) 
E68  E69  E70  E71  E72  E73  E74  E75  E76  E77  E78 
1  71  72  61  54  40  34  23  19  14  13  10 
2  9  9  12  13  15  15  16  15  14  14  14 
3  20  19  27  33  45  51  61  66  72  73  76 
N  8,117  7,379  7,379  6,837  6,837  6,392  6,392  5,871  5,871  5,415  5,415 
Instantaneous Employment Status (%) 
IE69  IE7 1  IE73  IE75  IE77  IE79 
1  74  61  40  24  16  12 
2  4  5  7  9  10  10 
3  22  34  53  67  74  78 
N  8,117  7,434  6,897  6,392  5,871  5,415 
Self-reported Employment Search Decision (a) 
SR69  SR7  1  SR73  SR75  SR77  SR79 
1  72  56  36  22  13  10 
2  5  12  13  15  13  12 
3  23  32  51  63  74  78 
N  7,894  7,434  6,897  6,392  5,871  5,415 
Self-Employment Status (%) 
SE69  SE7  1  SE73  SE75  SE77  SE79 
1  77  60  36  21  12  9 
2  8  12  16  18  19  18 
3  15  28  48  61  69  73 
N  8,070  7,431  6,881  6,387  5,861  5,407 
fied as being in state 2 by the E measure and in state 3 by the IE measure. 
The SE variable  seems like the poorest candidate for use as a measure of 
employment status owing to the ambiguity of the term “retired.”  Some people 
may interpret being “retired”  as quitting their career job and will report being 
fully or partly retired even though they are working full time at a new job. 
Other people may interpret “retired”  as meaning  “are you working now?” 
and will report that they are not retired if they had quit their main career job 
but are currently working at a new full-time job. Still others may report being 
partly retired even though they are not working because they like to think that 
they have the virility  to return to work at some unspecified  future date. The 
latter problem seems to be reflected  in table  11.8, which  shows that the SE 341  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
measure  substantially  overestimates the incidence of part-time work, some- 
times as much as 200 percent in comparison to the IE measure. I decided not 
to use the SE measure because of  the problems of ambiguity and subjective 
interpretation  and  also,  for reasons I  elaborate below,  because  SE is  an 
“instantaneous”  measure that does not correspond well to the time intervals 
of the DP model. 
The instantaneous  employment status  IE variable  completely  avoids  the 
subjective definition of the concept “retired.” Like SE, IE has a high response 
rate and is easy to pull from the tapes. However, it too has certain drawbacks 
from the standpoint of estimating the DP model. Since I am using a relatively 
coarse two-year  time interval  (for computational  reasons  discussed  in  sec. 
11.  l), the instantaneous IE measure would not provide a good measure of the 
worker’s actual state over the whole time period. In principle, workers may 
have changed  jobs many times in the two-year time interval or may have retired 
only recently, so there may be only a weak association between  IE and the 
respondent’s actual labor force status over the last two years. 
From the standpoint of the discrete-time DP model, the most appropriate 
measure of labor force status is the historical employment status measure, E. 
The main drawbacks of this measure are that (1) it requires the worker to recall 
his employment history (which may be especially difficult in the cases where 
the worker had multiple job transitions) and (2), since E is a flow measure, it 
may overestimate the occurrence of part-time work by misclassifying full-time 
workers  who retire  in mid-year.  Table  11.9 sheds  some light  on the last 
problem by summarizing the distribution of employment histories (using the 
E measure of e,) over the eleven years of the RHS survey. To keep the table 
manageable, the  1 l4  possible employment sequences have been “collapsed;” 
for example, the sequence (1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 3, M,  M) (where M  rep- 
resents missing data) is classified as a “  1-2-3”  sequence.  l9 
The first thing to notice is that, in contrast to the aggregate employment 
statistics, the individual employment sequences are far from smooth: only 18 
percent  of  the  sample  is  observed to  phase  out  of  work  gradually  in  a 
“1-2-3”  employment sequence. If I reclassify all “1-2-3”  sequences with 
only one intervening year in state 2 as actually being a misclassified ‘‘  1-3” 
sequence, then only 3 percent of  the sample is observed to follow a smooth 
employment transition; a plurality of the sample, 33 percent, are observed to 
follow the discontinuous “1-3”  sequence. Another 28 percent of the sample 
have complex  “nonmonotonic”  employment histories,  with periods  of  un- 
employment followed by subsequent reemployment. Of course, many of the 
“1”  and  “1-2”  sequences may  actually  be  right-censored  sections  of  an 
ultimate “1 -2-3”  sequence; however, since these sequences account for only 
14 and 4 percent of the sample, respectively, accounting for censoring will not 
change the basic picture. 
For  comparison, table  11.9 presents  the  distribution  of  employment se- 
quences for the IE and SE measures of e, and also for an annual measure of 342  John Rust 
Table 11.9  Distribution of Employment Sequences 
Measure of  Cases 
Employment 






2..  . 
3..  . 
1-3.  . . 
2-3.  . . 
1-2.  . . 




2..  . 
3... 
1-3. . . 
2-3.. . 
1-2.. . 




L..  . 
3... 
1-3.. . 
2-3.  . . 
1-2..  . 




2..  . 
3... 
1-3.. . 
2-3..  . 
1-2. . . 
1-2-3.  . . 
Others 
Total 
1,174  14 
91  1 
1.033  13 
1,488 (2,700)  18 (33) 
255  3 
306  4 
1,450  (238)  18  (3) 
2,334  29 
8,131  100 
1,321  16 
28  1 
1,337  16 
3,269  40 
112  1 
276  4 
308  4 
1,480  18 
8,131  100 
1,239  1.5 
131  2 
897  11 
2,642  33 
298  4 
60  1  7 
748  9 
1.575  19 
8,131  100 
585  23 
13  1 
187  7 
1,052  42 
29  1 
90  4 
89  4 
452  in 
2,497  100 
Nofet  Numbers in  parentheses obtained by  reclassifying all ‘‘  1-2-3”  sequences with only one 
intervening year in state e, = 2 as a “1-3”  sequence. See sec. 11.4 for further explanation. 
”An annual measure of employment status similar to E. This measure was constructed by Berkovec 
and Stem (1989), who wrote more than 2.000 lines of Fortran code to accurately follow NLS skip 
patterns to reconstruct the employment histories. 343  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
el similar to the E measure but computed from the NLS data by Berkovec and 
Stem (1989). Notice that, in all the tables, only 3-4  percent of all workers are 
observed to follow a “1-2-3”  sequence. The NLS data show a somewhat 
higher fraction of workers following a “  1 ”  sequence, but this is to be expected 
given that the NLS sample follows a younger group of men, who were initially 
aged 45-59  in the first year of the survey,  1966.”  Based on the comparison 
of the employment measures presented  in table  11.9, I decided to reclassify 
all “  1-2-3”  employment sequences with only one intervening year in state 
2 as a “1-3”  sequence by reassigning the state el = 2 as either e, = 1 or 
e, = 3, depending  on  whether hours  worked  in  that  year  are greater than 
1,000. 
Overall, table  11.9 casts doubt on the notion that most workers gradually 
phase out of their full-time jobs through a spell of “partial retirement,”  a view 
promoted  by  Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (1984)  and  suggested  from  casual 
interpretation of the macro data in table 11.8. Even if I counted all “1-2”  and 
“1”  sequences  as forming  part  of  an  eventual  “1-2-3”  sequence, the 
number of “smooth”  employment transitions would be at most 23 percent. In 
reality,  most  of  the  “1”  sequences  will  form part  of  an  eventual  “1-3” 
sequence, and a large fraction of the “3” sequences are actually left-truncated 
‘‘  1-3”  sequences. If I count all these sequences as “1 -3”  sequences, I obtain 
an estimate that approximately 75 percent of all retirement sequences involve 
discontinuous transitions from a full-time job into unemployment. Table 11.9 
also shows that a significant fraction of  the sample, over 18 percent, follow 
“nonmonotonic”  sequences involving some form of “unretirement,”  that is, 
a  return  to  full  employment  from  a  state  of  unemployment  or  partial 
employment.  Table  11.10  provides  more  detail  on  the  structure  of  the 
nonmontonic  employment  sequences  for  the  E, IE,  and  SE measures  of 
employment status. The structure of these transitions is extremely complex, as 
can be seen from table 11.10. The most common nonmonotonic sequences are 
3-1-3,”  “1-3-2,”  “1-3-1,”  “1-3-2-3,”  and  “1-3-1-3.”  Even 
though  a majority  of  workers follow the “  1-3”  sequence, the traditional 
approach to modeling  retirement behavior  as an  ex  ante choice of  a fixed 
retirement  date  after  which  the  worker  ceases  to  work  is  incapable  of 
explaining the labor force history  of  at least 20 percent  of  the sample. 
The discussion above suggests the possibility  that the discretization of the 
labor force status variable into just three states could seriously misrepresent the 
labor force  participationdecision.  Otherresearchers  (e.g., MaCurdy 1983)  have 
suggested that the labor force participation decision can be modeled as a con- 
tinuous choice variable, say, as choice of annual hours of work. There are strong 
practical reasons for maintaining this viewpoint: an interior solution allows one 
to derive stochastic  Euler orthogonality conditions that permit estimation of 
identified parameters by the method of moments (Hansen 1982). Figure 11.2, 
which  displays  the  distribution  of  annual  hours  of  work  over  the  period 
1968-78,  provides convincing evidence against  this view.  The distribution 
“ 344  John Rust 
Table 11.10  Distribution of Nonmonotonic Employment Sequences 
IE  E 
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has almost all its mass at two spikes, one at zero and the other at 2,000. The 
distributions are almost excessively concentrated at the two spikes, suggesting 
a  systematic  tendency  of  respondents  to round  their  reponses  (e.g.,  forty 
hourdweek, fifty weeksiyear).  Nevertheless, I  believe that  the distributions 
provide  solid evidence against the notion that annual  hours of  work  is best 
modeled  as a continuous choice variable that  satisfies an interior first-order 
condition.  This  notion  is  also  supported  by  the  work  of  Gustman  and 
Steinmeier  (1983,  1984), who present  convincing evidence of  widespread 
minimum hours restrictions  and significant wage cuts associated with transi- 
tions from full-time work to part-time. These constraints, combined with the 
Social Security  “earnings test,”  are probably  the key  factors  that  lead the 
majority  of workers to  follow a  “bang-bang’’ workho work decision  rule. 
Figure  1 1.2 also shows that the definition of the E variable is robust to fairly 
large changes in the cutoffs defining the three employment states: there is a 
small  amount of  probability  mass  uniformly  distributed  between  zero and 
2,000 hours  of  work,  so that  changes in  the  cutoff  in  this  range will  not 
significantly alter the distribution of  e,. 
I conclude this section by presenting Markov transition probability matrices 
for the IE and SE measures of  e, in table  I  I.  11 and the E measure  in table 
11.12. These are “uncontrolled”  transition probabilities  because I have not 
conditioned on a measure of the respondent’s  search decision, s,.  Neverthe- 
less, the resulting transition matrices are quite illuminating. The matrices show 
a clear pattern of age effects: for example, table  11.11 shows that the prob- 
ability of  reemployment  (i.e., a transition  from e, = 3 to e,+  = 1) is  16 
percent  in 1969 but  falls to 2 percent  by  1977 and that  the  probability  of 
remaining fully employed declines from 75 percent  in 1969 to 55 percent in 
1977.  Interestingly, the probability of retiring from a full- or  part-time  job peaks 
at approximately 40 percent between  1971 and  1973, declining to 30 percent 
in  1977. 
A  strange  pattern  appears in  the  historical  employment state transition 
matrices in table 11.12. Notice how the transition matrices appear to cycle in 
two-year intervals: for example, the (1, 1) elements appear significantly higher 
in even-numbered years, while the (3, 3) elements appear significantly higher 
in the odd-numbered years. For a long time, I was convinced that these regular 
fluctuations had to be an artifact of  my FORTRAN code for processing the 
observations.  I  labored  for  many  weeks  to  make  sure  that  my  program 
accurately followed the complicated skip patterns in the survey questionnaire 
but  had  no success in eliminating the  strange fluctuations  in the  transition 
matrices. Only recently have 1 become aware of work by Daniel Hill (1988) 
that has convinced me that the fluctuations are not artifacts of my computer 
programs but rather symptoms of a systematic response error problem known 
as the seam problem. The seam problem arises from the way the RHS collects 
data on retrospective labor force history in successive two-year survey frames. 
Each of  the odd-numbered  survey  years represents  a seam, and the  survey 347  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
Table 11.11  Transition Matrices for IE and SE Measures of' Employment Status 
IE69 to IE71  (N = 8,117) 
76  4  20 
30  37  33 
16  3  81 
IE71 to IE73 (N = 7,434) 
59  6  35 
19  39  42 
6  3  91 
IE73 to IE75 (N =  6,897) 
52  9  39 
15  46  39 
3  4  93 
IE75 to 1E77 (N = 6,392) 
53  11  35 
15  51  34 
3  4  93 
IE77 to 1E79 (N = 5,871) 
55  15  30 
18  48  34 
2  4  94 
SE69 to SE71 (N = 8,070) 
73  11  16 
19  42  39 
6  6  88 
SE71 to SE73 (N  = 7,431) 
55  15  30 
12  45  43 
4  7  89 
SE73 to SE75 (N = 6,881) 
50  17  33 
9  54  37 
2  7  91 
SE75 to SE77 (N = 6,387) 
45  23  32 
7  54  39 
2  6  92 
SE77 to SE79 (N =  5,861) 
52  22  26 
10  56  34 
2  6  92 
questionnaire  required the respondent to recall his labor force history in the 
two-year survey frame prior to the interview. It appears that, while respondents 
offer an internally consistent view of  the preceding two years, their view of 
history changes between survey dates in a way that generates inconsistent labor 
force  transitions  across  seams.  For  example,  to compute the  across-seam 
transition probability matrix from 68 to 69, I needed data from two different 
surveys: the  1969 survey gave me retrospective data on labor force states in 
68, and the 1971 survey gave me retrospective data on labor force states in 69. 
On the other hand, the between-seam transition probability matrix from 69 to 
70  was  computed  entirely  from  retrospective  data  obtained  at  the  1971 
interview. The pattern of fluctuations in the transition matrices indicates that 
men  in  state e,  =  1 are  more  likely  to remain  in  state  1  for across-seam 
transitions than for between-seam transitions, whereas men in state e,  = 3 are 
less likely to remain in state 3 for across-seam transitions than for between- 
seam transitions. 
I  have  recomputed  table  11.12  using  the  flag  variables  to  eliminate 
observations that showed any evidence of internally inconsistent responses. 348  John Rust 
Table 11.12  Markov Transition Matrices for Historical Employment Status 
E68 to E69 (seam: N  = 8,117) 
91  3  6 
30  43  27 
23  8  69 
E69 to E70 
82  7  I1 
18  58  24 
2  1  97 
E70 to E71 (seam: N  = 7.379) 
82  5  13 
29  51  20 
5  7  88 
E71 to E72 
71  10  19 
11  59  30 
1  2  97 
E72 to E73 (seam: N  = 6,837) 
74  8  18 
21  57  22 
3  7  90 
E73 to E74 
65  14  21 
9  61  30 
0  2  98 
E74 to E75 (seam: N  = 6,392) 
70  10  20 
14  58  28 
2  5  93 
E75 to E76 
63  16  22 
9  65  27 
1  2  97 
E76 to E77 (seam: N  = 5,871) 
76  9  15 
11  64  25 
I  5  94 
E77 to E78 
66  22  12 
I1  67  22 
0  3  97 
While the sample sizes were significantly reduced, the seam problem persisted. 
Although  an analysis of the perceptuaVpsychologica1 factors underlying  the 
seam problem  is beyond  the  scope of  this  paper,  it appears  that, by  using 
between-seam  transitions based on data from a single survey frame, one is 
much more likely to obtain a consistent set of transition probabilities. Indeed, 
looking at the between-seam transition matrices in table 11.12  one can see that 
they change in a sensible way over time, with no suspicious patterns indicative 
of  further inconsistencies.  In particular,  while the transition matrices do not 
closely  match the IE or SE transition  matrices  (the latter two are two-year 
transition matrices, while the E transition matrix is for one-year intervals), the 
matrices follow the same general pattern as the IE and SE transition matrices, 
namely,  a  probability  of  reemployment  and  continued  employment  that 
gradually declines over time. I conclude that the seam problem is sufficiently 
severe to make it inadvisable to build a DP model based on annual data even 
though such a model is superior from a theoretical viewpoint since it has “finer 
grain” and thus suffers less from problems of time aggregation. Instead, I will 
focus on constructing a model of biennial transitions, using consistent data on 
employment transitions between seams rather than across seams. 349  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
11.6  Job Search Decision 
The DP model requires a control variable s, that represents the respondent’s 
labor force search/participation decision. In a discrete-time model, the agent 
is in labor force state e,  at time t, and, conditional on e, and his search decision 
s,, he makes a transition to a new labor force state e,, ,  at time t  +  1. Thus, 
the  DP model  gives  an employed  worker  the  option of  quitting  (e,  =  1 
or e, = 2,  and s, = 3) and  an unemployed  worker the option of returning 
to work (e, = 3, and s,  = 1 or s,  = 2).  Unfortunately, while it is convenient 
to trichotomize s, into three values (1  = search for full-time job, 2  = search 
for part-time job, and 3 = quit the labor force), the “true”  search decision 
is  essentially  a  latent  variable:  a  complicated,  possibly  multidimensional 
variable  encompassing  the  variety  and  intensity  of  each of  the  worker’s 
possible search activities over the period. In the RHS, there are three possible 
variables from which to construct a measure of 3,: 
SR: self-reported planned  hours of  work in the year following the survey, 
NE:  actual hours worked in the year following the survey, 
PC:  actual hours worked in the year following the subsequent survey. 
The latter measure corresponds to a perfect control DP model where workers’ 
search decisions are successful with probability  one. The PC measure may 
seem  implausible  given  the  well-known  labor  market  problems  of  older 
workers,  yet on the other hand it necessarily  suffers much less from meas- 
urement  error.  In  this  paper,  however,  I focus  on the other two  measures 
Using the SR and NE measures, I constructed a trichotomous estimate of s, 
using  the  same cutoffs that I used to construct the e, variable described  in 
section 1  1.5. Table 11.8 summarizes aggregate distribution of the self-reported 
measure of s,.  This measure follows very much the same trends as the E, SE, 
and  IE  measures  of  e,:  a  gradual  phase-out  from  full  employment  into 
unemployment. The NE measure of s, is recorded in the odd-year columns of 
the E distribution at the top of table 11.8. At least on the aggregate level, the 
two measures appear to track each other fairly closely. 
To get a better handle on the issue of which measure of s, better approximates 
the underlying latent employment search decision, I computed the controlled 
transition probability matrices that predict the probability  of e,,  conditional 
on e, and s,. Table 1  1.13 presents the controlled transition matrices using the 
E measure fore, and the SR measure for s,.  These matrices show a very weak 
relation between employment search decisions and ex post realized employ- 
ment states. If control were perfect, the transition matrix should have ones in 
the column corresponding to the value s, assumes. However, in table 1  1 .13 we 
see that under the  SR measure control is highly  imperfect.  For example,  a 
full-time worker who reported  an intention to quit working in  1969 still has 
a 25 percent  chance  of  remaining  at  work  in  1971. A  worker  who  had  a 
full-time job in 1968 and who reported an intention to start working part time 
of  s,. 350  John Rust 
Table 11.13  Controlled Transition Probabilities, SR Measure of Job Search 
Variable,  s, 
E68 to  E70 Given SR69 =  I  (N = 5,707) 
81  7  12 
58  20  22 
50  17  33 
E68 to  E70 Given SR69 = 2 (N = 394) 
33  13  54 
24  51  25 
3  20  77 
E68 to E70 Given SR69 = 3 (N =  1,793) 
26  12  62 
14  20  66 
15  5  80 
E70 to E72 Given SR71 =  1 (N = 4,150) 
71  10  19 
54  25  21 
29  29  42 
E70 to E72 Given SR71 = 2 (N = 884) 
4  20  76 
14  54  32 
5  34  61 
E70 to E72 Given SR71 = 3 (N = 2,345) 
5  6  89 
8  17  75 
2  4  94 
E72 to E74 Given SR73 =  1  (N = 2,508) 
60  14  26 
40  34  26 
27  28  45 
E72 to E74 Given SR73 = 2 (N = 859) 
12  20  67 
14  55  31 
4  35  61 
E72 to E74 Given SR73 = 3 (N = 3,470) 
3  6  91 
5  20  75 
2  4  94 
E74 to E76 Given SR75 =  1 (N = 1,372) 
58  14  28 
31  36  33 
13  16  71 
E74 to E76 Given SR75 = 2 (N = 981) 
7  20  73 
II  55  34 
6  22  72 
E74 to E76 Given SR75 = 3 (N = 4,039) 
1  11  88 
3  17  80 
2  4  94 
in  1969 has only a 20 percent  chance of actually realizing  his intentions by 
1970. An unemployed worker in  1974 who reports the intention to return to 
work full time in 1975 has only a 13 percent chance of actually being employed 
in  1976. Thus,  the  SR  measure  of  s, leads  to  a  DP where  control  is  too 
imperfect,  in  the  sense  that  there  is  an  implausibly  low  correspondence 
between employment search decisions and subsequent labor market outcomes. 
Table 11.14 presents controlled transition probabilities for the E measure of 
e, and the NE measure of  s,. Comparing tables  11.13 and  11.14, we can see 
that, while the NE measure of s, does reflect imperfect control,  the relation 
between  sl and  el+,  is much  stronger than  for the  SR measure  of  s,.  For 
example, consider  the  probability  that  a  worker  who  intends  to  quit  his 
full-time job is successful (i.e., the transition from el =  1 to e,,  I  = 3 given 351  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
Table 11.14  Controlled Markov Transition Probabilities, NE Measure of 
Employment Search Decision, s, 
E68 to E70 Given E69  =  1 (N = 5,348) 
83  6  11 
76  15  9 
78  11  11 
E68 to E70 Given E69  = 2 (N = 554) 
14  58  28 
23  57  20 
12  60  28 
E68 to E70 Given E69 = 3 (N = 1,477) 
3  2  95 
1  4  95 
1  I  98 
E70 to E72 Given E71  =  1 (N = 3,767) 
72  9  19 
55  25  20 
67  20  13 
~ 
E70 to E72 Given E71  = 2 (N = 645) 
10  54  36 
14  56  30 
6  71  23 
E70 to E72 Given E71  = 3 (N = 2,376) 
1  3  96 
4  13  83 
0  1  99 
E72 to E74 Given E73 =  1 (N = 2,183) 
67  12  21 
48  36  16 
61  21  18 
E72 to  E74 Given E73  = 2 (N =  817) 
7  54  39 
11  61  28 
7  69  24 
E72 to E74 Given E73 = 3 (N = 3,335) 
I  1  98 
1  10  89 
0  2  98 
E74 to E76 Given E75 =  1 (N =  1,167) 
66  13  21 
38  39  23 
60  13  27 
E74 to E76 (Given E75 = 2 (N = 790) 
4  49  47 
10  67  23 
7  70  23 
E74 to E76 Given E75 = 3 (N = 3,914) 
1  5  94 
2  9  89 
0  2  98 
s,  = 3). In 1968, the NE measure gives a 95 percent chance that the decision 
will be realized, compared to only 62 percent for the SR measure of  s,.  In the 
case of an unemployed worker who intends to return to work, the data for 1974 
show that, according to the NE measure of s,, the worker will have a 60 percent 
chance of success, compared to only a 13 percent chance for the SR measure 
of s,. It is perhaps not surprising that the NE measure of s, should have a strong 
correspondence  with e,,  since s,  is simply a lagged  value of  e,, , and the 
{e,}  process is highly serially correlated. However, it is somewhat surprising 
that the SR measure of s, has such a weak correspondence  with subsequent 
employment  outcomes. This may  be  an  indication of  the fact that  “talk  is 
cheap”: it is one thing to say that you intend to remain employed or return to 
work but quite another thing actually to go out and do it. A model using the 352  John Rust 
NE measure is a compromise between the implausible perfect control model 
implied by the PC measure of s, and the perhaps equally implausible imperfect 
control model  implied by the SR measure. 
Tables  1 1.15 and  1 1.16 present the maximum likelihood estimates of  the 
controlled  transition  probabilities  using  the  E  measure  of  e, and  the  NE 
measure  of  s,.  The  estimates  correspond  to  the  component  T,  in  the 
decomposition  of  T  given  in  (5). The probabilities  were estimated  using a 
Table  11.15  Estimates of  Employment Status Transition Probability 
(dependent variable: I{ez+, = 1)) 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic 
e, =  I, s,  =  1 
e,  = 2, J,  =  1 
e, = 3, s,  =  1 
e, =  I, s,  = 2 
e, = 2, s,  = 2 
e,  = 3, s,  = 2 
e, =  1,  s,  = 3 
e, = 2, Y,  = 3 
e, = 3, s,  = 3 
h, =  1, h,,,  =  1 
h, =  1, h,,,  = 2 
h, =  1, h,,,  = 3 
h, = 2, h,,,  =  1 
h, = 2, h,,,  = 3 
h, = 3, h,,,  = 3 
a, E  [60, 62) 
u, E [62, 65) 
a, E [65,  68) 
a, E [O,  60) 
Y, E  [O, 4) 
Y, t  [4, 7) 
Y, E  [7, 10) 
v, E [lo, 13) 
Y, E  [13, 21) 
Y, E  [21, 31) 
ms, = 2, ms,,,  = 2 
ms, =  I, ms,,, = 2 
ms, =  1,  ms,,,  =  I 
ss, E {I, 2},  s,  =  1 
ss, E {I, 2}, s, = 2 
ss, E  {I, 2},  s, = 3 
Log likelihood 
Grad - direc 
correctly predicted  (%) 




-  .92 
-  .22 





-  .09 
-  .86 
-  .01 
-  .50 




-  .05 
-  .52 
-  .55 
-  .45 
-  .43 
-  .34 
-.I5 
-.I0 
-  .I7 
-  .21 
-  1.50 
-  .76 











-  .79 
-2.60 
-  .07 
-  1.32 




-  .50 
-  2.60 
-  3.23 
-2.69 
-2.50 
-  1.92 
-  .73 
-  .29 
-  .44 
-  .64 
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Table 11.16  Estimates of Employment Status Transition Probability 
(dependent variable: I{el+l = 3}) 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic 
e, = 1, st  =  1 
e, = 2, s,  = 1 
e, = 3, s,  =  1 
e, = 1, s,  = 2 
e, = 2, s, = 2 
e, =  1, s,  = 3 
e, = 2, sl  = 3 
e, = 3, s,  = 3 
h, = 1, h,,,  = 1 
h, = 1, h,,,  = 2 
h, =  1, h,,,  = 3 
h, = 2, h,,,  = 1 
h, = 2, h,,,  = 3 
h, = 3, h,,,  = 3 
a, E [O,  60) 
a, E [60, 62) 
a, E [62, 65) 
a, E [65. 68) 
Y, E [O,  4) 
Y, E 14, 7) 
Y, E [7>  10) 
Y, E [lo, 13) 
yr E [13, 21) 
y, E W,  31) 
e, = 3, s,  = 2 
ms, = 2, ms,,, = 2 
ms, = 1, ms,+,  = 2 
ms, =  I, ms,,,  =  1 
ss, E {1, 2},  s,  =  1 
ss, E {l,  2},  s,  = 2 
ss, E {l,  2},  s, = 3 
Log likelihood 
Grad - direc 
Correctly predicted (%) 
Total observations 
-  .52 
-1.19 
-  .81 
-  1.52 
-  1.87 




-  .44 
-  .02 
.73 
-  .38 
.77 
.48 










-  .27 
-  .42 




-  1.24 
-  2.67 
-  1.77 






-  5.15 
-  .25 
2.48 
-  3.03 
2.20 
2.53 










-  .81 
-  1.10 








linear-in-parameters specification of a trinomial logit model of  the probability 
that e,, , assumes the three values {  1, 2, 3). Table  11.15 presents  the para- 
meter estimates corresponding  to the event I{et+  = 1) (full-time work), while 
table  1  1.16 presents  the  parameter  estimates corresponding  to  the  event 
Z{et+  = 3) (unemployment).21  The interpretation of  the estimation results has 
already been  summarized in  conclusion 5 of  section  11.2 and will  not be 
repeated here. 354  John Rust 
11.7  Income, Wealth, and Consumption 
Next to employment status, the most important state variables of the DP 
model are income y, and wealth w,.  The RHS has detailed information on assets 
and debts in each of  the odd-numbered  survey years,  1969-79,  as well  as 
detailed  information  on the components of  income in the  preceding  even- 
numbered years, 1968-78.  Although consumption c,  is treated as an observ- 
able control variable, in reality it is essentially a time aggregration of thousands 
of individual unobserved buylno buy decisions over the two-year period.  My 
strategy  was  to use  the  budget  equation  w,+~  = w, +  y, - c,  to infer 
consumption expenditures from measurements of wt+  I ,  w,  ,  and y, . There are 
two obstacles to this approach: the RHS has no data on capital gains income, 
and the RHS records income only in even-numbered years. Thus, capital gains 
and income in odd-numbered years must be imputed. A key to accurate income 
imputations is the use of the retrospective labor force histories to construct the 
e, state variable. 
I initially tried to impute the missing income values by regressing income 
in even-numbered years on variables available in both even- and odd-numbered 
years. Among  the variables  available in  both even and odd years  were  the 
SSER earnings records (up until  1974) and the SSMBR OASDI benefit data 
(from 1969  to 1978). Despite the inclusion of these variables and retrospective 
data on  total hours worked  in odd-numbered  years, the fits of  the  income 
regressions  were not very impressive, with R2 values of  60 percent at best. 
Using the estimated regressions to fill in the missing income values produced 
intuitively  unreasonable  results,  generating  wide  swings  in  income  that 
occasionally  turned negative or exceeded reasonable values. 
An  approach that  turned  out  to work  much better  was  a  simple ad  hoc 
procedure I call “full information interpolation.”  One can divide income into 
four  sources:  (1)  wage  income,  (2)  OASDI  income,  (3)  unemployment 
insurance, and (4) other income. Since 1 have OASDI income in all years, that 
variable does not  need to  be imputed.22 In  addition, since other income is 
predominantly asset and pension income, which is largely independent of labor 
force participation, I obtained an estimate for category 4 by simply averaging 
observed other income in adjacent even-numbered years. The problem thus 
reduced to computing wage income and unemployment compensation. Using 
the retrospective employment histories, I obtained an estimate of  total hours 
worked in each year. Dividing hours worked into observed wage income, I 
obtained  a  wage  rate  that  I used  to compute total  wage  income  in  odd- 
numbered  years.23 If  there  was  evidence  that  the  worker  had  become 
involuntarily unemployed  during the period, I imputed unemployment  com- 
pensation as well. The resulting interpolation estimates appeared much more 
reasonable than the regression-based imputations. In particular, there were far 
fewer wild  swings in  income,  very  few  excessively large  values,  and  no 
negative income values. Figure  I  I .3 plots the imputed and reported income 355  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
distributions  for  the  six-year  period  1973-78.  There  is  evidently  little 
difference between the imputed and the reported  income distributions; both 
have the characteristic lognormal shape. There is a noticeable leftward shift in 
the distribution over time as more and more workers withdraw from the labor 
force. This shift is not as pronounced as it might be because of the replacement 
of  wage  income  by  OASDI  and  pension  receipts.  If  I  were  to  plot  wage 
distributions only, the leftward shift would be much more pronounced. 
The existence of the  seam problem  in the employment  data discussed in 
section 11.4 led me to suspect the possibility that these inconsistencies might 
have contaminated the imputed income data. To  see whether there was any 
evidence of this, I plotted the distributions of income changes in figure  1 1.4. 
These distributions show no evidence of the seam problem, perhaps because 
wage income became an increasingly less important source of income over the 
survey and because the SSER earnings records and the SSMBR OASDI benefit 
data  allowed  me  to  get  relatively  accurate  measurements  of  the  main 
components of income for the majority of the sample. In any event, I conclude 
that my  income imputations appear to  be  fairly reliable measures of actual 
income. 
Having said this is not to deny the existence of systematic response errors 
in reported wage and OASDI benefits. For example, section 11.3  discussed the 
widespread  underreporting  of  Social  Security disability  benefits.  To  assess 
how  accurately  respondents  reported  their  income,  I  used  the  SSER  and 
SSMBR  data  sets  to  compare reported  and  actual  earnings  and  OASDl 
benefits. Because of the Social Security maximum earnings limitation, OASDI 
recipients had  a clear incentive to deny or underreport  their wage earnings 
since the survey was conducted for SSA. On the other hand, OASDI benefits 
themselves  do not  enter  into the  “earnings  test,”  so there  is  no  obvious 
incentive to underreport these receipts.  Figure  11.5 presents the distribution 
of  the percentage difference between  reported  wages and SSER earnings in 
1970 and the distribution of percentage response error in total OASDI benefit 
in  1974.24  The figure shows no obvious evidence of systematic underreport- 
ing, although each contains spikes at -  100 percent indicating a nonnegligible 
fraction of  respondents  falsely reporting that they  had  no wage  or OASDI 
income. On the basis of these comparisons, I  set flags indicating the degree 
of accuracy of the respondent’s reports of his wage and OASDI benefits. I then 
used  these  flags  in  the  construction  of  a  sample  boolean  to  screen  out 
questionable respondents. 
I used the Hurd wealth data (see n. 2 above) to compute respondents’ net 
worth. Net worth consists of financial and real assets less total indebtedness, 
but excludes pensions, life insurance,  and annuities (the latter two are fairly 
uncommon  in  the  RHS  anyway).25 Wealth  data  are  extremely  hard  to 
cross-check because major components of wealth, such as the market value of 
the respondent’s house,  are often subjective guesses. Figure  11.6 plots the 
distribution of wealth for the six survey years. Notice that there is a significant income  Distribution ir  1973 
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fraction of respondents, about 10 percent, who report that they have essentially 
no tangible wealth. Mean wealth levels are about $28,000 1968 dollars, equal 
to approximately four years of  income. These distributions provide little evi- 
dence that respondents consume their wealth as they age. Figure l l .S  plots the 
distribution of housing value to net worth in  1969 and  1979. It shows that a 
large fraction of  workers’ wealth is tied up in housing: homeowners have an 
average 56 percent of their wealth tied up in housing in  1969, increasing to 
65 percent in 1979. The failure of wealth to decrease over time may be partly 
due to the appreciation of housing in the inflationary  1970s. 
Using Hurd’s wealth data and my imputed income series, I constructed an 
imputed  biennial  consumption series  using  the budget  identity  c, = w,  - 
w,+,  + y,. The resulting consumption distributions are plotted in figure 11.7. 
Overall, the distribution of consumption looks very similar to the distribution 
of  income plotted  in  figure  11.8; both  income  and  consumption show  a 
noticeable tendency to shift leftward over time. This fact is not an accident 
since figure  11.9 shows that  the distribution  of  wealth  changes is centered 
about zero, suggesting that to a first approximation, c, = y,. Indeed, the mean 
wealth  change (averaged  over all  periods  and  workers)  is  $-6S8,  with  a 
standard deviation  of  $47,015.  Given that average wealth  is $28,000, it is 
difficult not to conclude that most of the variation is due to measurement error. 
The large standard deviation  suggests that it would  be difficult to reject the 
hypothesis  that  c, = yr. However,  a  simple hypothesis  test  of  H,:  c,  = 
y, versus HA:  c, Zy,  yields a x2  statistic of  6.2 with a marginal significance 
level of just over 1 percent: a rejection that is perhaps not surprising given that 
I have 31,348 observations on wealth changes.26 
Whether the  large variance  in  wealth  reflects  explainable differences in 
behavior  or simple measurement  error is an  open question, but  my  initial 
investigations suggest the dominance of the latter. Like the employment data, 
aggregate consumption  appears fairly smooth, slowly declining over time in 
apparent  accord  with  the  standard  life-cycle  hypothesis. However,  at  the 
individual  level,  measured  consumption  is  anything  but  smooth,  making 
violent, unpredictable swings over time. Overall, a total of 1,984 respondents 
have negative measured consumption in at least one of the five biennial survey 
periods,  and in successive periods more than half the sample is recorded  as 
having either a consumption increase of more than 200 percent or a consump- 
tion decrease of more than 50 percent. These large swings in consumption fly 
in the face of intuition and personal observation of the consumption behavior 
of the elderly, suggesting that most of the swings are due to measurement errors 
in wealth. 
One possible reason for negative consumption is the failure to account for 
capital gains. Given the subjectivity of  respondents’  assessment  of  housing 
values and the fact that a majority of workers continue to live in the same house 
rather than “size down,”  it seemed reasonable to attribute all changes in net 
housing  wealth  to  capital  gains  (provided  the  respondent  did  not  move). Wealth  Distribution in  1969 
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Adding  these  housing  capital  gains (or losses)  did  reduce  the  number  of 
negative consumption cases somewhat, to 1,522, but overall the distribution 
of  consumption including capital gains looked very similar to the distribution 
of consumption  without capital gains. 
The notion that response errors in wealth are driving the violent swings in 
consumption is confirmed by examining individual data records. Having access 
to a complete data record over the survey period often provides enough con- 
textual information to enable one intuitively to identify reporting and recording 
errors that are responsible for negative consumption values. Table  1 1 .I7  pre- 
sents  relevant  data  for  a  “typical”  respondent  (ID 6886)  with  negative 
measured  consumption. This man-call  him Bob-is  coded  as having  the 
occupation of  craftsman  in the construction  industry; most likely, Bob is a 
carpenter.  Bob responded  in all six of  the survey waves and provided  very 
complete answers; all the variable flags (with the exception of  consumption) 
indicated very high confidence levels in his responses. Bob is married, living 
with spouse, and was working full time until  1975, when he turned 65, quit 
his job, and started collecting Social Security (Bob had no pensions).  By  all 
accounts, Bob is just the kind of guy I want in my sample: a typical blue-collar 
worker who seems to provide complete, reliable answers, who has slightly 
above average income, and who has most of  his wealth in housing. However, 
we can see from table 1 1.17 that, while Bob’s income declined slightly from 
$12,000 to $1 1,000  over the decade and his measured consumption was about 
equal to his income stream in four out the five two-year  periods, for some 
reason his consumption over the period of 1976-77 is recorded as $ -  35,630. 
Analysis of  his balance  sheet reveals that, between  the  1975 and the  1977 
interviews,  his house value increased from $14,000 to $100,000, increasing 
his  overall  net worth from $10,794 to $57,376.’’  This sudden increase  in 
wealth is responsible for the recorded negative consumption  in the 1976-77 
biennium.  A possible explanation for the increase is coding error: Bob may 
have reported his house value to be $10,000 in  1977, but it was mistakenly 
recorded as $100,000. However, this explanation becomes less plausible when 
we realize that his house value is recorded at $150,000 in 1979: it seems very 
unlikely that we would get the same kind of coding error in the same variable 
in two consecutive years. 
If we look further into the data, we find that Bob moved between  1975 and 
1977. This suggests several possibilities.  Bob and his wife may have moved 
into the house of his wealthy son and mistakenly reported the value of his son’s 
house as his own. Bob may have previously grossly underestimated the value 
of his old house and used the capital gains on the sale of the old house to finance 
the purchase of  his new house. Bob may have won a lottery, which provided 
an unrecorded capital gain that he used to purchase his retirement dream home. 
Bob may have owned other real estate which he failed to report in previous 
interviews  and  has  since  used  to  buy  his  retirement  home.  Or,  being  a 
carpenter, Bob may have built his own retirement home and, blinded by the 
pride of creation, grossly overestimated its value. Given the wealth of possible 365  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of  the Life Cycle 
Table 11.17  Selected Financial Data for “Bob,”  (RHS ID, 6886) 
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100,OOO  150,000 
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0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
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0  0 
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0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
”This measure of c, does not include imputed capital gains. 
qhis  measure includes imputed capital gains as described in the text. 
explanations, it is not easy to know what to do. One can simply exclude cases 
with  negative  measured  consumption, but  that  still  leaves  the  problem of 
hundreds of  cases with implausibly large or small measured consumption or 
cases where consumption changes vary erratically from year to year. 
In conclusion, while one might attempt to identify reporting problems by 
examining observations on a case-by-case basis, it is unrealistic to think that 
one could screen out a sufficiently high fraction of  “bad”  cases to end up with 366  John Rust 
a  subsample  for  which  consumption  is  measured  accurately.  Not  only  is 
case-by-case examination  of 8,13  1 individuals impossibly time consuming, 
but the resulting data set would be susceptible to the criticism that the sample 
had been “hand picked” to support an apriori theory. If an error-identification 
strategy is to be successful, one should be able to write out a series of objective 
classification rules, say in the form of a computer program, that would allow 
other researchers  to replicate  the subsample.  I  have not been  successful in 
constructing a computer program with sufficient “intelligence” to examine the 
wealth data on a case-by-case basis, recognize the existence of a data problem, 
and take appropriate corrective action. AS I discussed above, it is not sufficient 
simply to screen out cases with negative consumption because the remaining 
cases still suffer from reporting problems that produce unrealistically large 
swings in consumption. Because of these problems, I have opted against using 
consumption data in my first attempts at estimating the DP model. Until I see 
convincing evidence that changes in wealth are not dominated by measurement 
error,  or until  I  am successful  in  constructing  an  “artificial  intelligence” 
program that reliably discriminates accurate survey responses from inaccurate 
responses,  I  will  adopt  the null hypothesis  that  c,  = y, and focus  on  “ex- 
plaining”  the joint dynamics of x, = (y,,  e,, sr,, a,, ms,,  h,) and d, =  (s,,  ss,), 
excluding w,  and c,  from the model. 
11.8  Estimating the Stochastic Process of  Income 
All that remains is to specify and estimate the final component of workers’ 
beliefs,  the transition  density  for income ry.  The lognormal  shapes of  the 
income distributions plotted in section 11.7 suggest that the transition density 
rrY should  have  a  lognormal  distribution  with  parameters  (k  a) that  are 
parametric functions of the state and control variables listed in the decompo- 
sition (5). As is well known, if  a random variable 9 has a lognormal distri- 
bution, then its mean and variance are given by 
(7)  E[j]  = exp{p.  + a2/2}, 
var[j]  = exp(2k + 2a2} - exp{2p + a*}. 
It is extremely important to allow both p.  and (T to depend on the state variables 
since, if a is fixed, then (7)  and the autoregressive properties of the income 
process  will  imply  that  the  variance  of  yt+, is  a  quadratically  increasing 
function of current income yt. Thus, by failing to specify a properly,  one is 
making an implicit assumption about the form of heteroscedasticity that may 
grossly misrepresent  workers’  actual  beliefs.  Once we have decided on the 
appropriate functional forms for k and u,  the lognormal model is fairly easy 
to estimate: one obtains initial estimates of  (k,  a)  by a log-linear regression 
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by maximum likelihood.28 There is a minor problem concerning the fact that 
the DP model requires y, and its transition density nTT,  to be discretized. My 
approach was to discretize y, as an independent variable entering (p,  a)  but 
to do the  estimation  treating  the  dependent variable  Y,+~  as  a  continuous 
variable. After estimating  the  relevant  parameters, it  is easy  to generate a 
discrete transition probability  matrix fry: simply compute the area under the 
lognormal density corresponding to each of the discrete income cells for y,+ ,  . 
The hard  part  is  to  specify  how  the  parameters  (p,  a) depend  on  the 
underlying state and control variables. The specification is crucial here because 
not  only must T?  embody workers’  expectations  about  how  future income 
depends on their current employment, health, and marital status but it must 
also embody the relevant rules and actuarial structure of the Social Security 
OASDI system, including the regressive  nature of  the payout  schedule, the 
extra payments to spouse, the penalty for early retirement, and the “earnings 
test” for workers under 70. As I discussed in my earlier paper, by estimating 
T,,  using  income data over the decade of  the  1970s (during  which  Social 
Security benefits  increased  more  than  50  percent  in  real  terms),  I  have 
implicitly  assumed  that  workers  have  “semirational”  expectations:  that  is, 
they correctly anticipated the increase in benefits over the  1970s but did not 
expect any benefit changes thereafter.29 
My initial attempts to estimate T?  yielded disappointing results.  Although 
the coefficient estimates for the marital status, employment status, and search 
variables had reasonable signs and magnitudes, the variables representing the 
structure of OASDI benefits either had small, insignificant coefficients or else 
had the wrong sign. The estimated model looked as if workers were unaware 
of key features of  the OASDI benefit plan, and the few provisions  they did 
know about seemed to be regarded as taxes instead of benefits. Apparently, the 
Social Security benefit structure was “drowned out” by sample selection bias. 
A simple explanation of the problem goes as follows. High-income  workers 
typically  continue working  beyond  retirement  age  and  delay  collection  of 
Social Security,  whereas  low-income workers  stop working  and begin  col- 
lecting Social Security as soon as they can, typically at age 62. A regression 
model attempts to fit the data by flipping the sign of  Social Security variables: 
collection of  Social Security benefits  is spuriously predicted to reduce total 
income.  My  solution  to  the  problem  was  to  augment  the  data  set  with 
“artificial”  data on the incomes that retired workers would have received in 
the absence of OASDI payments. Thus, corresponding to each data record for 
a retired worker receiving OASDI (ss,  E (1, 2}),  I created a duplicate record 
deducting all OASDI benefits from the worker’s income y, and setting ss,  = 0. 
This procedure, which nearly doubled the number of  observations, produced 
dramatically improved  results.  In  particular,  nearly  all  the  Social Security 
variables  had  significant coefficients  with correct signs and magnitudes. In 
effect, the augmented data “drowned out” the sample selection bias, allowing 
me to capture the true underlying  OASDI benefit structure more accurately. 368  John Rust 
The existence of the SSMBR data set was absolutely crucial to the success of 
this procedure since, as I have shown, the magnitude of response error in the 
self-reported values of certain Social Security benefits such as SSDI is so large 
as to render them useless. 
A  final  problem  I encountered  concerned  the  estimation  of  age-income 
effects. In my initial specifications, I included the polynomial terms in the age 
variable a, to capture the independent effects of aging on income. Just looking 
at the estimated coefficients,  the estimated  model  seemed quite reasonable, 
with age terms all entering with highly significant coefficients. However, when 
I  plotted  out  the  age-income  profiles,  the  results  were  clearly  far from 
reasonable.  In models that included only a linear term in a,, the age-income 
profile sloped upward, whereas in models with quadratic and cubic age terms 
the age-income profile was hump shaped: rising until age 70 and then falling 
sharply thereafter. The incomes predicted  by the hump-shaped profiles were 
completely unreasonable: at the top of the hump a 70-year-old worker who was 
currently earning $10,000 could expect to earn nearly double that amount two 
years  later if  he continued  working.  On  the other hand, on the downward 
sloping part of the profile, say at age 80, the worker would only expect to make 
half as much even if  he continued working. The reason behind these strange 
results is lack of data on earnings for very old men. As I have discussed before 
in  section  11.4, the  RHS  has  no  data  on  workers  older  than  73.  Thus, 
estimation of  age-income profiles beyond age 73 requires pure extrapolation 
over a region where there  are no observations to guide us. Including poly- 
nomial age terms in the regression produced unreasonable forecasts because 
the estimation procedure chose the coefficients to get a good fit in the region 
where there are a lot of observations, namely, for ages 58-68.  Since there are 
no  observations  beyond  age 73,  the  regression  does  not  “care”  what  its 
predictions are in that range, producing unreasonable results. In order to avoid 
the extrapolation problems  inherent  in the use of  polynomial  terms, I tried 
specifications using age dummies, which entail the implicit extrapolation that 
age-income profiles are constant after age 73. In spite of my hopes,  the age 
dummies  also  yielded  somewhat  disappointing  results:  the  estimated  age- 
income profile fluctuated up and down with no clear pattern. Since I have little 
a priori knowledge of the correct shape of the age-income profile,  I decided 
simply not to include a, in the estimation of n,,. 
Table  1 1.18 presents the specification  for T~  that I finally settled on. The 
main implications of table 1 1. I8 have already been discussed in conclusion 6 
of section 11.2 and will not be repeated here. However, to convince the reader 
that  the estimated  model  really  does endow  workers  with  sensible  income 
expectations, I present a graphic summary of the predictions of the model in 
figure 11.10. 
Figure 1 1.10 presents the estimated transition densities +tY  for four config- 
urations of the conditioning variables listed in (5)  corresponding to the beliefs 
of four different workers about their future income, $,+ ,  . The sharply peaked 
density marked with triangles represents the expectations of a single man, aged 369  Behavior of  Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
Table  11.18  Estimates of Income Transition Probability 
(dependent variable: In[y,+ ,I) 
u Parameters 




h, =  1, h,,,  =  1 
h, =  I. h,,,  = 3 
h, = 2, h,,,  = 2 
h, = 2, h,,,  = 3 
h, = 3, h,,,  = 3 
s, =  1, e,,,  = 1 
s,  1, e,,,  = 3 
s, = 2, e,,, = 1 
s, = 2, e,,,  = 2 
s, = 2, e,,, = 3 
s, = 3, e,,, =  1 
s,  = 3, e,,,  = 2 
s, = 3, e,,, = 3 
s, = 3, e,,,  = 3, y, < 4 
s, = 3, e,,,  = 3, y, > 15 
ms,  = 2, ms,, , = 2 
ms, =  1, ms,,, = 2 
ms,  =  I, ms,,, =  1 
ss, # 0,  ms,  = 2, ms,,, = 2" 
ss, # 0, e,,,  = 1" 
ss, # 0, e,,,  = 2" 
ss, # 0, e,,,  = 3" 
ss, = 2, e,,,  =  1" 
ss,  = 2, el+, = 2" 
ss, = 2, e,,,  = 3" 
ss, # 0, a, 2 70, e,, , =  I" 
ss, # 0, a, 2 70, e,,, = 2" 
Log likelihood 
Grad  direc 
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"These variables are all multiplied by  l/ln(y,) 
75, who is disabled, out of  the labor force, and receiving  a total income of 
yr = $4,000. The density marked with the circles corresponds to a 65-year-old 
retired man who is married, in health state h, = 2, and receiving an income 
of y, = $7,000. The density  marked  with  boxes  corresponds  to  a married 
58-year-old man who is in good health, working full time, with a total income 371  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
ofy, = $12,000. Finally, the curve marked withx’s corresponds to a wealthier 
80-year-old man who is not retired, married, in good health, and continues to 
work full time, earning an income of y,  = $20,000. 
Figure  11.10  also  presents  estimates  of  workers’  expected  income, 
ECV,+Ile,+l,  ms,+l,  h,,,  ,  x,,  d,, a,},  plotted  as  a  function  of  their  age. 
Although the profiles are flat by construction (the estimated model excluded 
u,), the figures provide an indication  of  the dynamics of  income as workers 
retire. Each of the figures contains four curves, corresponding to four different 
retirement paths. The curves marked with boxes correspond to working full 
time until age 65 and then collecting OASI. The curve marked with circles 
shows what  the  worker  would  expect  if  he  quit  working but  did  not  start 
collecting OASI. The other two curves represent the expectations of a worker 
who works full-time until his early 70s but then becomes disabled and has to 
quit work. The lower curve represents what the worker would expect if there 
were no OASDI program to cover him; the higher curve represents what the 
worker would expect if he applied for OASDI. Note carefully that the curves 
in figure  I 1.10 represent conditional expectation functions: they are not the 
same as the sample paths of  the income process.  Given the strong autocor- 
relation  in  income,  actual  sample  paths  of  income  will  look  quite  a  bit 
different. The figure clearly shows the progressive nature of the Social Security 
system.  Indeed, a very low-income worker actually expects to do better by 
retiring  and  collecting  OASDI  than  continuing  to  work  at  his  low-paying 
full-time job.  However,  figure  11.10 shows  that,  for  a  very  high-income 
worker, the percentage replacement rate of OASDI benefits is much smaller: 
Social Security is not such a good deal for these workers. 
Finally, figure 11.10 also includes a plot of  the standard deviation of y,,  , 
as a function of  current income, y,. The four curves are all upward sloping, 
representing the fact that, the higher a worker’s current income is, the more 
uncertain  he  is  about his  future income.  Note that, while  uncertainty  does 
increase  with  y,,  the  increase  is  far  from  proportional:  this  is  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  fact  that  ln(y,)  enters  the  u parameter  with  a  large, 
significant negative coefficient,  as you can see from table  1 I.  16. The four 
curves in the figure correspond to four classes of workers. The curve marked 
with  boxes  corresponds  to  a 60-year-old  worker  who  is married,  in  good 
health, and working full time. The curve marked with circles corresponds to 
a worker who is 88, disabled, and out of the labor force. The curve marked 
with  triangles  corresponds  to  a  worker  who  is 68, single, in  health  state 
h, = 2,  and is retired and receiving Social Security. The final curve, marked 
with x’s,  corresponds  to  a 55-year-old  man  who  is single,  in  health  state 
h, = 2, and working part time. 
11.9  Modeling the Retirement Decision 
The SSMBR data allow me to determine exactly when a worker applys for 
and  receives  OASI benefits.  In  my  opinion,  the  only  sensible and  precise 372  John Rust 
treatment of the concept of “retirement”  is to define it in terms of collection 
of OASI benefits. I used the SSMBR data set to construct the control variable 
ss, defined in (2). Figure 1  1.1  1 summarizes this variable in terms of the implied 
distribution  of  age of  first entitlement  to OASDI.30 The distribution  has  a 
pronounced bimodal shape, with peaks at the early retirement age 62 and at 
the normal retirement age 6.5. Overall, nearly all the sample applies for benefits 
between the ages of  62 and 6S.3’ 
One can, however, define retirement in terms of withdrawal from the labor 
force. The discussion in section 11.5 indicates that this is an extremely tricky 
business since there is no clear-cut way to define “withdrawal from the labor 
force.” Figure  11.11 presents  a  “retirement  age”  distribution tabulated by 
Burtless  and  Moffitt  (1984),  who  used  the  RHS  data,  the  instantaneous 
measure of  labor participation  IE, and a definition  of  “retirement”  to be a 
sudden, discontinous drop in labor supply to under thirty hours per week. This 
distribution is significantly  more  spread  out than  the distribution  of  age of 
entitlement to OASDI. In particular, the peaks at ages 62 and 65 are much less 
pronounced, and there are much larger fractions of workers retiring before and 
after  ages  62  and  6.5,  respectively.  Figure  11.11  also  presents  similar 
distributions tabulated from the RHS by Sueyoshi (1986), using instantaneous 
hours of work data and still another definition of retirement,  and finally my 
own tabulation based on my classification of the workers’ employment history 
(i.e., for workers’ following the standard “1 -2-3”  and “1 -3”  employment 
sequences,  retirement is defined as the age at which the worker first enters 
employment state 2 or 3; for those with nonmonotonic employment sequences, 
it is defined as the age at which the worker first begins collecting OASDI). 
Although each of  the definitions yields a significantly different retirement age 
distribution, it is difficult to say which is the “right”  one. However, it turns 
out that both the Burtless and Moffitt and the Sueyoshi distributions signifi- 
cantly  understate the  number of  early age 62 retirements  and overstate the 
number  of  age 65 retirements.  While  it  is  likely  that  their  definitions  of 
retirement have obscured some important features of  the data, this analysis 
suggests that  a  debate  about  the  “correct”  definition  of  retirement  age is 
simply  ill  posed  in  the  context  of  a  more  realistic  dynamic  model  of 
employment transitions. 
What  we  can conclude  from  figure  11.11 is  that  there  are  a  significant 
number of workers who apply for OASI in their mid-60s but continue working 
for  several  more  years.  One can  see this  most  clearly  by  comparing  the 
distribution of  the age at which respondents were first entitled to OASDI versus 
the distribution of ages at which  they  first received  six or more months of 
OASDI benefits (an indirect indicator of withdrawal from the labor force). The 
peak of early retirements at age 62 is nearly identical in both graphs: the primary 
differences are a shift in probability mass from retirements in the 63-65  age 
group to the age 66-72  age group and  a near  doubling  of  the  number  of 
respondents who never ended up collecting OASI benefits at all, from 687 to Sueyoshi  Retirement Age 
54  56  58  60  62  64  66  68  70  72 
Age  First  Entitled to  OASDI 
54  56  58  60  62  64  66  68  70  71 
Age  First  Rece “ed OASDl 
Rust Retirement Aqe 
Fig. 11.11  Distributions of retirement ages implied by alternative definitions of  “retirement” 374  John Rust 
1,101. There are four main reasons why the subsample of 1,100 workers never 
collected OASDI benefits: (1) the worker died before he had a chance to receive 
benefits (458 cases); (2) the worker was not eligible for OASDI, either due to 
the  fact that  he  was  not  in  a  covered  occupation  or had  not  accumulated 
sufficient quarters of  coverage to  qualify  for benefits  (405 cases); (3) the 
worker applied and was entitled to  OASI but lost 100 percent of his benefits 
owing to  earnings  well  in  excess of  the Social Security  earnings test  (184 
cases), and  (4) the worker never  applied  for benefits  even though  he  was 
eligible (fifty-four cases). Nearly all workers in the latter group had sufficiently 
high  earnings  that  they  would  not  have  received  benefits  even if  they  had 
applied. Only four or five cases can be identified where an unemployed worker 
apparently  “forgot”  to apply  for his  Social Security  benefits.  Among the 
subsample  of  workers  who  ultimately  collected  OASI  benefits,  there  is  a 
two-year average delay between application and first receipt, from age 64 to 
66, primarily due to that fact that benefits were taxed away due to earnings in 
excess of the earnings test levels. However, the predominant majority of this 
sample, 71 percent, first collected benefits in the same year that they became 
eligible.  Approximately  18  percent  began  collecting  one  year  after  their 
entitlement, another 6 percent began collecting two years after entitlement, and 
the  remaining  5  percent  collected  benefits  three  to  nine  years  after  first 
entitlement. This raises the question, Is it irrational to apply for benefits before 
age 65 yet continue working up until the normal retirement age and thereby 
lose nearly all benefits due to the earnings test? Close inspection of the Social 
Security regulations reveals that this is not irrational behavior. Section 729 of 
the 1974 Social Security Handbook provides for expost adjustment of the early 
retirement benefit reduction factor to exclude months between ages 62 and 65 
for which work deductions  were imposed. Thus, even though a worker has 
applied for benefits before age 65, his ultimate reduction factor is based on his 
age when benefits are first paid. Early application simply provides an option 
for immediate collection of benefits in the event of unexpected unemployment 
but does not necessarily imply a permanent  reduction in benefit  levels. 
Further  insight  into the  issue  is  provided  by  the  distribution  of  “self- 
reported” retirement age, defined as the age at which the worker first reports 
being “retired or partly retired.”  This distribution supports the view that, even 
though a large number of workers apply for OASI at age 62, many of them 
continue working  for several years thereafter.  Further analysis  (beyond  the 
scope of  this  paper)  indicates  that  the  majority  of  workers  who apply  for 
benefits at age 62 and continue working are either low-wagehncome workers 
whose total annual earnings at ages after 62 are not significantly higher than 
the  earnings test  level  or are  a  smaller  group of  workers  who apparently 
initially intended to quit working at age 62 but experienced adverse financial 
problems  or  encountered  a  particularly  attractive  job  opportunity  that 
prompted them to return to work. But by far the biggest discrepancy between 
the entitlement  and labor force  withdrawal  definitions of  retirement  is for a 375  Behavior of Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle 
10 percent  subsample of wealthy  professionals  and  self-employed  workers 
who apply for Social Security benefits by age 65 but continue working well 
into their 70s. This type of behavior is evidently not irrational. 
By in large, the analysis and estimation results in the previous sections of 
the paper suggest two main conclusions about the decision to retire and collect 
OASI: workers who retire and receive OASI appear to be less healthy than their 
counterparts who continue to work; and, once a worker starts collecting OASI, 
he is significantly less likely to return to work on either a full- or a part-time 
basis. 
Finally,  analysis  of  the RHS data provides  clear evidence of  the role of 
self-selection in the decision to collect OASDI; poorer, less healthy workers 
are more likely to quit their jobs and retire early, even given the permanent 
20 percent penalty for early retirement.  This may be rational behavior given 
the reduced life expectancy of unhealthy workers and the well-known fact that 
the OASI benefit structure is not actuarially fair. A more complete analysis of 
these issues must await the estimation of the DP model in the third part of this 
series. 
Notes 
1. For example, there is no attempt to measure consumption flows from durable 
goods such as housing, automobiles, furniture, etc. The questionnaire also requires 
estimates for expense categories that may be very hard to recall, e.g., amount spent in 
restaurants, amount spent for newspapers, amount spent for haircuts, etc. In fairness, 
I should mention that some authors, such as Hurd (1990),  have attempted to use this 
data in  an attempt directly  to impute total consumption  c,.  Other authors,  such as 
Skinner (1987),  propose using explanatory variables common to the more complete 
Consumer Expenditure Survey to compute regression-based imputations of consump- 
tion. 
2. The wealth and income data used in this study were produced by  the program 
IMPUTE, written by  Beth van Zimmerman and Phil Farrell, research associates of 
Michael Hurd, State University of New York at Stony Brook. Besides imputing missing 
values, the program estimated the value of service flows for owned assets such as autos 
and housing at a presumed opportunity cost of  3 percent. 
3. Constructing labor force histories turned out to be a major undertaking, requiring 
over eighty pages of FORTRAN code and over four months of full-time work to write 
and debug. The difficulties arose  from the need carefully  to track the  survey skip 
patterns to extract the required variables from a battery of more than 130 questions in 
the “Work Experience”  section of the RHS. Fine attention to detail was required to 
avoid  misclassifying  20  percent  of  the  sample  of  workers  with  “nonstandard” 
employment histories with multiple job transitions within the two-year survey period. 
4. Of course, I will be happy to provide the reader with the data and documented 
versions  of  all  computer  programs  used  to  generate  the  variables  so  that  other 
researchers can verify any of my results,  should they choose to do so. 
5. Bienniel  income  was  used  only  for  purposes  of  constructing  a  measure  of 
consumption.  Based  on  conclusions  2  and  3  above,  I  have  decided  to  exclude 376  John Rust 
consumptionlsavings decisions and formulate a DP model with biennial time intervals, 
measuring workers’ states over the preceding even-numbered survey years. Thus, the 
DP model will actually use the annual income flows that were recorded in the surveys. 
For further justification of this approach,  see conclusion 6. 
6. A related problem with the disability classification, the fact that the probability 
of  becoming disabled declines sharply to zero at age 62, is also an artifact of Social 
Security rules and is discussed further in conclusion 2 of  sec.  11.2. 
7.  This decision is relevant only for workers who are over 62, have sufficient quarters 
of coverage to qualify for fully insured status, and have not previously applied for Social 
Security. 
8. Cross-validation procedures can be used to fix values for some of the smoothing 
parameters, but ultimately many choices, such as the functional form of the kernel, are 
completely arbitrary. 
9. The  latter  conclusion  disappears  if  I  exclude  the  variable  sr, distinguishing 
respondents who are receiving OASDI.  Since men who collect OASDI have higher 
death rates, excluding sr,  produces a model where death rates increase slightly with age. 
10. Social Security law prohibits a disabled worker from engaging in  “substantial 
gainful activity”  unless they are over age 62, at which time benefits convert to re- 
tirement benefits  and  are  subject to  the  usual  earnings  test.  Disabled  workers are 
allowed to participate in a nine-month trial work program, after which continued work 
leads to termination of disability benefits. However, very few disabled workers ever 
return to work.  Modeling  the underlying decision process  of  whether to apply  for 
disability benefits is hampered by lack of data on respondents who applied for and were 
denied disability benefits. 
11. The finding for single workers might be partly a result of  sample selection bias: 
single workers are presumably less likely to have a family support network to rely on, 
so they are more likely to become institutionalized if they have serious health problems. 
Such workers are lost from the sample since the RHS did not attempt to interview 
institutionalized individuals. 
12. Here, s, is proxied by the NE measure of the employment search decision defined 
in section 11.1. 
13. Recall that my  income measure includes net asset income (including imputed 
income from assets such as net housing equity), non-Social  Security pension income 
(although the sample selected out individuals who had significant pension income), and 
income from relatives and other sources. My estimates of the reduction in income from 
retirement (defined here as quitting the labor force and applying for Social Security 
benefits) are somewhat higher than those of Fox (1984), who found that retirement leads 
to a 30 percent median percentage drop in total income for workers without private 
pensions. 
14. In  order to keep the length of  this paper within bounds, I have chosen not to 
present the estimation results that lead to this conclusion. I defer the presentation of the 
results to the third paper of  the series, which will examine the heterogeneity issue in 
more detail. 
15. The nonresponse file was compiled by  the Census in  the process of conducting 
the RHS interviews and was used by SSA as part of  an internal auditing system to 
remove  cases  in  which  the  interviewer  was  unable  to contact  the  original  1969 
respondent or related household members. For some reason, the nonresponse data were 
not included on the RHS tapes and are available only separately as a subfile of  the 
SSMBR tape. The nonresponse file will also be used in sec. 11.4 to identify men who 
were institutionalized after the 1969 interview. 
16. Note that the pararncter standard errors and t-statistics have been corrected using 
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17. Although  the  total  number  of  cases  seems  small,  think  of  the  millions  of 
unnecessary tax dollars spent if  this error rate exists in the population at large. 
18. The aggregate mortality rates were obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (U.S. Census 1979). In future work, I would like to formally incorporate 
auxiliary mortality data for very old men into a pooled maximum likelihood estimation 
of  the  death  hazard  model.  A difficulty of  this  approach  is the  likely  absence  of 
associated health and employment status in any auxiliary data set. This will require me 
to  “integrate  out”  these  variables,  which  in  turn  requires  further  distributional 
assumptions on the cross-sectional distributions of health and employment status for 
very old men. Given these problems, I decided to use the short-cut described above. 
19. I collapse those sequences for which M’s occur only as trailing sequences. Cases 
where there are intervening occurences of M’s  (respondents who missed one survey but 
were subsequently interviewed) are classified in the “others”  category in table 11.9. 
20.  The  NLS  contained  an  enriched  sample  of  black  respondents,  who  are 
presumably more likely to be unemployed. Apparently, the effect of a more youthful 
sample in the NLS dominated the effect of a larger proportion of blacks, leading to the 
discrepancies noted above. 
21. Since probabilities sum to one, it is not necessary to present parameter estimates 
for the event I{e,+, = 2}, which is equivalent to normalizing the parameters corre- 
sponding to the event I{e,+  = 2) to zero. 
22. I substituted actual OASDI benefits from the SSMBR rather than reported OASDI 
benefits to calculate total income in even-numbered years. 
23. Workers whose imputed wage appeared to be either unreasonably large or small 
or whose wage rate changed significantly were flagged and reexamined. Many of the 
unreasonable  cases appear  to  be  a  consequence  of  reporting  errors  in  income  or 
employment status. The income distributions presented in figures 11.3, 11.4, and 11.8 
do not screen out these questionable cases, however. 
24. The “actual”  wage income was taken as the value recorded by Social Security 
in the SSER data set. This income measure is right censored at the Social Security 
maximum earnings levels of $7,800 in effect over the period  1968-71.  I have not 
attempted to use the quarters of  coverage data to impute actual total wage earnings 
according to the method of Fox (1976). 
25.  While pensions are much more common than  annuities in the RHS sample, 
exclusion of pension wealth is not a problem since the sample boolean already excludes 
workers with pensions. 
26.  The hypothesis  actually tested was H,:  w,  = w,,,  vs. HA: w,  # w,,,.  It  is 
easy to see that the budget identity implies that this is equivalent to the hypothesis test 
listed above. I assume that appropriate regularity conditions hold in order to justify the 
asymptotic x2  distribution for the test statistic, e.g., weak mixing conditions on the 
level of serial dependence in the observations. 
27.  Note that no capital  gains are imputed since  Bob moved during the period, 
making it impossible to determine how much of the value of the new house came from 
capital gains on the sale of the old house. 
28. Although the likelihood function is concave, using the regression starting values 
(as opposed to  zero  starting values)  substantially reduces  the  number  of  iterations 
needed to converge. 
29. In  fact, the large benefit increases in the 1970s put severe strain on the Social 
Security trust fund, necessitating substantial tax increases to fund the system.  Fully 
rational workers might have plausibly expected real benefit decreases in the future. 
30. A worker is entitled to OASDI if he (1) is at least age 62, (2) has filed a valid 
application  for benefits,  and  (3) has  sufficient quarters  of  coverage  to  qualify  for 
retirement benefits. If the worker is under age 62, he is entitled to disability benefits 378  John Rust 
if he filed a valid application and was granted disability insured status by  the Social 
Security Administration. 
31. The fact that so few workers apply for benefits after age 6.5 might initially appear 
somewhat surprising in  light of the fact that a significant number of  higher-income 
workers continue working full time well into their 70s. It turns out that, under Social 
Security rules, there is no reason to delay application for benefits after age 65 since 
workers must first be entitled to OASI in order to be entitled to Medicare hospital 
insurance coverage (cf. sec. 104-A of the 1974SocialSecurity Handbook). Since Social 
Security benefits are automatically  recomputed after initial entitlement, there is  no 
benefit penalty  (owing  to  the  computation  of  average  monthly  wage)  to  delaying 
application beyond age 6.5. In addition, delayed retirement credits are determined on 
the basis of the worker’s age when he is first paid benefits rather than on the worker’s 
age when he  applied.  All  these  factors of  the benefit structure explain why  hardly 
anyone applies for benefits after age 6.5. I also take it as  prima  facie evidence that nearly 
all workers are cognizant of the Social Security benefit regulations. 
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Comment  Angus Deaton 
This paper is a remarkable member of  a remarkable sequence. Following the 
example of Trollope and Dickens, Rust is telling us his story in installments, 
each of  which ends suspensefully; the next in the series will surely reveal all 
and resolve the tension. The mystery here is whether the trick can be done at 
all.  Will  the  Retirement  History  Survey  (RHS)  yield  to  the  calculus  of 
stochastic  dynamic programming  and  reveal  the  true  story  of  aging  and 
retirement? Or has structural estimation in econometrics at last attempted too 
much, even structural estimation  in the hands of  John Rust and the super- 
computer? We  shall  have  to wait  another year  to  find  out, but  the latest 
installment, as it  should,  certainly  serves to  complicate the  plot.  It also 
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provides a peculiarly inappropriate position from which to review the research; 
anything said now is likely to look foolish at the next round. 
The most difficult task in applied econometrics is to make a clean transition 
from theory  to  implementation. I  am referring  not  to the estimation  or the 
interpretation of results but to the intermediate stage where sharply delineated 
theoretical notions have to be matched up to imperfect and error-ridden data. 
In the face of complex reality, theoretical concepts quickly lose their sharpness 
(what is retirement?),  and even the best surveys turn out to have omitted the 
simplest and most important questions. This paper, which is the second in the 
sequence, is concerned with cleaning data and matching it to the demands of 
the theory. Rust’s model is one of discrete choice, where controls are set at a 
limited number of positions so as to affect outcome states, each of which must 
also be discretely defined. The constraints facing optimizing consumers are the 
laws  of  motion  of  the  system, the  transition  probabilities  that  govern the 
evolution of  the state variables, conditional on their own past values and on 
the values of the controls. Apart from the data exercises, the specification and 
estimation of these probabilities is the main task of the paper. 
One of  the benefits of a series of papers is that it is possible to detail much 
of the important material that would typically be suppressed in journals. Rust 
has done an extraordinarily good job of  laying out exactly what he has done; 
honesty and care shine out from every page. This paper and its predecessor are 
the best counterexamples I know to the accusation  that high-tech econome- 
tricians care little about their data (or that those who care about numbers know 
nothing  else!).  The amount of  work  that  has gone into data preparation  is 
astonishing;  the RHS tapes  have  been  matched  to the  census, to  the  SSA 
records, and to the results of earlier researchers’ work. Each observation has 
been multiply “flagged”  to indicate assessments of data reliability and every 
detail of  the process  encoded and preserved  to enable replication  by  other 
scholars. When the next  installment  comes and  we find out  whether  a DP 
model can fit the RHS, it will be impossible to ascribe failure to inadequate 
data preparation or to suspect data “cleaning”  for results that look too good. 
But commentators are not supposed to express unbounded admiration, or at 
least not only unbounded admiration. So I should like to identify a few points 
in the paper where I was left feeling uneasy, where the compromises that had 
to be made seemed to be beginning to threaten the structure. There are two 
issues that I should like to draw out, both concerning methodological questions 
about  this  sort of  structural  modeling,  as opposed to the  more ad hoc  or 
reduced-form analyses that has been adopted by most other researchers.  The 
first  concerns  data  quality.  There are many  points  at  which  an  important 
theoretical variable has to be replaced by a very imperfect substitute. There are 
also many magnitudes that appear to contain egregious errors of measurement, 
errors that are more than usually exposed through Rust’s tireless analysis of 
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the least) nonlinear, and there is no good way of handling measurement errors 
in such a model. So it is going to take some extraordinarily  sensitive testing 
of  the final model to try to separate those parts of  the results that are due to 
measurement  error and those that are credible and robust. 
The second issue concerns Rust’s modeling of  the “laws of  motion of the 
system,” the transition probabilities that govern the consumer’s progress from 
state to state. Ideally, these laws of motion would be given, like the laws of 
physics, they could be set up as constraints, and the calculation and estimation 
of  the  DP could  begin.  But, of  course, the  transition  probabilities  are not 
known and have to be estimated. Rust summarizes his findings in section 11.2. 
Given the discretization of the states, the transition probability matrix contains 
some 130,000,000  elements, all of  which have to be estimated from the data. 
Since most  of  the  transitions  are never  actually  observed in the  sample, 
nonparametric estimation is not possible. Instead, Rust imposes structure on 
the probabilities,  equation (5), and then estimates a  system of  logits.  The 
structure used is a recursive one; health status is influenced only by lagged 
variables,  current health status and lagged variables influence marital status, 
health and marital status jointly condition employment, while health, marital 
status, and employment condition the evolution of income. All this is perfectly 
reasonable, but of course it may not be correct. Rust tells us that, having tried 
various decompositions of  the transition probabilities,  the one that he found 
most plausible was the one discussed above. It is hard not to be reminded of 
the  analogies  with  structural  and  reduced-form  debate  in  macroeconomic 
modeling. It was exactly this use of  “reasonable”  (but arbitrary) exclusion 
restrictions  that  had  much  to  do  with  the  retreat  toward  less  structured 
approaches, and I felt uncomfortable finding the same sort of  issues in the 
current context. The next stage of the research, the calculation of a maximizing 
strategy in the face of the constraints, will ruthlessly expose any flaws in the 
modeling at this stage. If there is some cheap but absurd method of generating 
utility, the algorithm will find it. Again, there is analogy with macro, where 
the first wave of  enthusiasm for optimal control  of  Keynesian  econometric 
models quickly foundered on those models’ lack of a supply side; optimal plans 
clearly involved eating the capital stock. Rust is too good an economist to fall 
into any of these obvious traps, but my feeling of discomfort remains. Are the 
estimates of  the transition  probabilities  really  soundly  enough grounded  to 
support the very great strain that is about to be placed on them? 
There are some specific points in the paper where concern about the two 
general issues comes to a head. First, the consumption data, imputed  from 
income and wealth changes, are too dreadful to use, so that it is going to be 
necessary, at least at first, to estimate a model that maximizes, not the expected 
utility of consumption, but the expected utility of income. This may not do too 
much harm, but it is a pity that so many of the important issues (life-cycle 
saving, wealth accumulation or decumulation, saving and retirement dates) are 382  John Rust 
thereby  lost  from  the  analysis.  Rust  discounts  the  possibility  of  using  the 
partial consumption data in the survey, but the decision might be worth some 
further consideration. 
My second point concerns the definition of one of the two control variables, 
search effort  in the labor market.  Rust considers three possible measures: a 
self-reported intended hours next year; the actual hours two years hence, that 
is, in the next actual sample period; and the actual hours in the intermediate 
year. The first is rejected because  “talk  is cheap”  and because the quantity 
bears little relation to outcomes.  The second  is rejected  because  it implies 
complete control. Fine, but I find it hard to see why the last measure is likely 
to be a good proxy either. While it  is true that it predicts employment quite 
well,  there  are any number of  reasons why  it  should, not  all of  which are 
consistent with it being a good proxy for search effort. Indeed, a worker might 
record a large number of hours, though fully intending to be unemployed next 
period, and a partially or totally  “retired”  worker could easily be searching 
very actively. Some workers may even take early retirement in order to search 
more actively for a suitable subsequent occupation. 
My  third,  and  final,  point  is  again  on the  estimation  of  the  transition 
probabilities,  and again it is an issue of  which Rust is fully aware.  Hetero- 
geneity of workers, or equivalently incomplete accounting of  states, is quite 
likely to lead to inconsistent estimates or to spurious identification of causality. 
There are obvious examples throughout the paper, many  of  which are dealt 
with, such as the fact that “collecting OASI can be hazardous to your health.” 
I was also amused to discover that, once single, a worker has less than a 7 
percent chance of finding a new mate and that bachelors, who have no prospect 
of remarriage, can expect their income to fall at 20 percent a year. But, more 
seriously, I would expect heterogeneity to be a serious problem, and, although 
Rust evidently worries about it less, I should have been happier had some of 
the  supporting  evidence been  included  in  the  paper.  Perhaps  in  the  next 
installment. 